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CONCEPTS OF BUDDHISM

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BY

BIMALA CHURN LAW, PH D, M A, B L

*Author of a History of Pāli Literature, Life & Work of Buddhaghosa
Some Historical Notes of Ancient India etc*

WITH A FOREWORD BY

THE MOST HONBLE THE MARQUESS OF ZETLAND,
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA



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FOREWORD

The stimulus given to research by the late Sir Asutosh Mukherji when as Vice-Chancellor of the Calcutta University he set on foot an ambitious scheme of postgraduate studies, has brought into existence a body of Indian research workers who for some years past have been carrying on work first undertaken by European scholars of world-wide reputation. Prominent amongst those who have turned their attention to the early history and philosophy of the Hindus is Dr. Banala Churn Law who has to his credit a number of volumes throwing light on the history and culture of the peoples who some four or five hundred years before the Christian era, inhabited that part of India of which Patna, the capital of the modern province of Bihar, is now the centre. It was here that Buddha lived and preached the doctrine of which Dr. Law gives us in the present volume a scholarly analysis based upon a careful study of the original texts.

In its main outlines the doctrine of Buddhism is now pretty widely known. But a full understanding of it must necessarily depend upon the interpretation placed upon the many technical terms and phrases in which it abounds, and it is this task of interpretation that Dr. Law sets out to discharge. It is not without significance that two of the shortest and most widely known words in the literature of Buddhism — *Dharma* and *Nibbana* — are precisely the words which have given rise to the greatest degree of controversy.

It is not surprising, therefore, to find that it is to the concepts indicated by these two words that Dr. Law devotes the greatest amount of space. It may be that the reader of his chapter on *Nibbana* will leave it with the conclusion that it was not the least element in Buddha's greatness that unlike the generality of mankind — even of Buddhist mankind — he remained unmoved by the logical conclusion of the human mind handicapped by the necessity under which it labours of functioning within the limits of time and space, that *Nibbana* is the equivalent of extinction.

To follow the author in his examination of these two concepts would demand far more space than the writer of a foreword is entitled to let me therefore, by way of illustration of Dr Law's analysis, take one of the less difficult of the concepts of Buddhism namely, that of the Four Noble Truths in which are proclaimed the existence, the cause and the possibility of escape, from suffering and finally the means of escape by way of the Noble Eightfold Path. The steps in the Noble Eightfold Path — right view, right resolve, right speech, etc. — are well known what is less well known is their precise significance and it is this that Dr Law proceeds to explain. His analysis of the concept constituting the first of the Four Noble Truths — *Dukkha* the affirmation that all existence is suffering — may be taken as an example of his method. *Dukkha* whether of the body or of the mind is conditioned by certain circumstances and in the absence of such circumstances it cannot occur. These circumstances may be described comprehensively as the day to day experience of conscious life and if the succession of such experiences or happenings cannot be changed it is at least open to the harassed mortal to enquire if there be any state of consciousness, or attainment, to which an individual is no longer affected by life's vicissitudes. The answer given by Buddhism affirms that there is attainable a state in which the consciousness of the individual is wholly unrelated to anything to which in life as we know it we can apply the term 'object'. The tried method of reaching that state is *Jhāna* or *Samādhi*. *Jhāna* or *Samādhi* is therefore, according to Dr Law, the central point in the Noble Eightfold Path the other seven practical constituting steps leading up to it. But neither *Jhāna* nor *Samādhi* is the simple concept which the above account might lead one to suppose and Dr Law devotes a chapter based on a wide selection of texts from the Buddhist scriptures and commentaries to a careful analysis of these essentially important terms. Here we pass into the higher realm of abstract thought and the reader must follow carefully in the footsteps of the author himself.

I am tempted to make one further reference to the subject matter of Dr Law's volume namely to his chapter on *Puggala* in which the case for and against the existence of an individual as a permanent entity is discussed. It will be remembered how in the *Vidudapāṭha* or 'Questions of King Mahinda' the King is driven

by the invincible logic of the Sage Nāgasena into admitting that there can be no such thing as an individual soul. How then, it will naturally be asked, can there be rebirth, the chief of the evils which it is the object of the Buddhist to escape, since to speak of re-incarnation when there is no soul to take on flesh, or of its transmigration when there is no entity to migrate, is merely to indulge in a contradiction in terms? Nāgasena, the Sage, had his answer. Dr Law has his. Indeed with happy condensation he crystallises the Buddhist view on this vexed question in a single sentence —

With the Buddhist rebirth is to be conceived as *Asammasānādi* or the continuity of an impulse.

The many other concepts of Buddhism including that of the Wheel of Causation with the twelve *nidānas* as its motive force, and the doctrine of *Kamma*, the Pali spelling and the Buddhist version of the Sanskrit doctrine of *Karma* which constitutes the warp upon which the threads of the whole variegated philosophy of Hinduism is woven, will be found similarly analysed in the pages which follow. But I have said enough, perhaps, to make it clear that scholar and layman alike will find good value in the lucid exposition of these and other concepts of Buddhism which Dr Law gives us.

ZETLAND

16.8.1936

PREFACE

In this little treatise an attempt has been made to deal with some of the important concepts of Buddhism *Sarana* (Profession of Faith) *Piṇḍita* (Perfection) *Jāti* (Caste) *Arhāsacca* (Four Noble Truths), *Āriya atthangika Magga* (Noble Eightfold Path), *Jhāna* (Meditation), *Puggala* (Individuality and Personality) *Paṭicca-samuppāda* (Dependent Origination) *Kamma* (Volition) *Dhamma* and *Nibbāna*. I must confess that it has not been an easy task to handle the subject, as the main concepts of Buddhism still require a very careful consideration before saying anything definitely about them. I have, however, spared no pains to throw some new light on the subject from the texts that have not been accorded the treatment they deserve.

I must acknowledge my gratitude to the Most Honourable The Marquess of Zetland, P.C., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Secretary of State for India, who has very kindly contributed a foreword to this treatise in spite of the heavy burden of his duties. I remain ever grateful to him for the interest he takes in my researches.

The Kern Institute of Holland has done me a great honour by accepting this treatise as their monograph for which I am greatly thankful to the authorities of the Institute and especially to my esteemed friend Professor J. Ph. Vogel, C.I.E., Ph.D.

BHARATI CHURNI LAL

43, Kailas Doss Street
Calcutta, the 9th September
1930

*Upasaka*¹ *Sarasagamas* is of two kinds *loka* (common) and *lokuttara* (uncommon) *Loka* *sarasa* contemplates the tangible attributes of the Triad while the *lokuttara sarasa* aims at *naraina* as the supreme object of attainment.² Buddhaghosa speaks of the following four modes of *sarasagamas*

- (1) Self-dedication (*atta samarajjanana*)
- (2) Having the mind bent upon the object (*leppasamvattaya*)
- (3) Entering into relation as a disciple (*sasabbhāvāpaga nana*)
- (4) Adoration (*pamphāna*)

The first mode is defined as conscious dedication of oneself to the Triad. The second mode consists in entertaining the Triad as the final end or ideal. The third mode consists in conscious acceptance of the position of a disciple or follower in relation to the Triad. The fourth mode consists in the act of saluting, honouring and glorifying the Triad. In following the fourth mode the devotee must believe that the object of worship is the highest of its kind (*aggadakkhinaya*).³

Buddha, the first member of the Triad, *mā* is the Enlightened or Awakened One. According to the *Upanads* *Buddha* in the sense of the Awakened occurs as a predicate of 'soul'. *Suprabuddha* is the equivalent of the *arhat*.⁴ *Sammāsambuddha* and *Parinirvā-Buddha* are self-made personalities. They are called self-made because they attain *māhi* by their own efforts without the aid of any teacher. A *Sāṃvāsa Buddha* is one who has become a saint by following the teachings of a Master. A *Buddha* is also called a *Bhagava*. According to the *Mahāvīdya*⁵ and the *Paramatthajotika*⁶, the epithet *Bhagava* was bestowed on the Buddha neither by his parents nor by his other relations. It was acquired by him on his attainment of omniscience. *Bhagava* is equal to *bhagavatta* one endowed with *bhaga*, which in its generally accepted sense means the twofold supreme possession of *issariya*, *dhamma* *jasa* *siri* *kāma* and *pavata*. *Issariya* com-

¹ *Suman ala* *Udā* I p. 34 *Upasaka upasaka*
Idem I p. 31

² *Idem* I pp. 32-33

³ *Dhammapada* *Udā* 30-301
 Pf. 14-143

⁴ I pp. 107-108

Refuge now ¹ For this and other aspects of *Dhamma* vide Chap on Dhamma

Saṅgha, the third of the Triad, includes *Bhikkhu saṅgha* and *Bhikkhunī-saṅgha*. It really means *Sāmaṅga saṅgha* or a fraternity of disciples. *Saṅgha* literally means *samāṅga* or group. In early Pāli literature some of the famous teachers of India are mentioned as *saṅghi* (founder of an order) *gaṇi* (having a following) and *gaṇacariya* (teacher of a group). At the time of the rise of Buddhism, the Vṛjś Mallas, and other Kṣatriya tribes were known as *Gaṇarājās* or republican chiefs. Even the Śākya had their *gaṇa* form of administration. A *saṅgha* is a corporate body which is characterised by the uniformity of creed and conduct (*Dutthi-sīlasaṅghātena saṅghāto ti saṅgho*)². *Samaggatā* or internal cohesion constitutes the real life of a *Saṅgha* as such. The unity of action and commonness of goal characterise its external life. Thus the *saṅgha* stands essentially as a symbol of unity. The Buddha compares the *saṅgha* to an ocean into which all individual rivers ultimately fall, assuming the common name of the ocean. According to the Buddha's Mirror of Faith, *Saṅgha par excellence* is composed of all Aryan disciples who fill eight exalted positions.

¹ *Majjhima* III p. 9

² *Samangala vidhana* I p. 230. *Paramatthapada* I p. 20

CHAPTER II

PĀRAMITĀ

(Perfection)

*Pāramī*¹ is the same term as *Pāramita* and both occur side by side in Dhammapāla's commentary on the *Carayapitaka*.² So far as later Buddhist literature goes, the bulk of Pāli works shows preference for *pāramī* and that of Sanskrit works for *pāramitā*. In the Pāli canonical texts, however, *pāramī* is the only form met with. In the *Niddhakaṇḍa-sutta*³ we have *amala-pāramī* the perfection of disceptship which is no other than the fruition stage of arhatship, the ripeness of saintship which is the ideal before a Buddhist learner or aspirant. In the *Buddhavaṃsa* on the other hand, the term *pāramī* is employed as a synonym of *Buddhakāra dharmā*, the virtues or qualities which tend towards making a Buddha, i.e. maturing the life of a Bodhisattva for the attainment of Buddhahood in his last birth. Precisely in this sense Dhammapāla uses the term *Buddhakāra dharmā* and quotes a passage of canonical authority with bearing on the point. The passage cannot be traced in the Pāli Text Society's edition of the *Tiṇḍaka*. Even if its antiquity be doubted on this ground (which is not very reasonable) there is the text of the *Buddhavaṃsa* to show that at least as far back as the 3rd century B.C. *pāramī* was treated as another term for *Buddhakāra* or *Buddhakāra dharmā*. It goes also to show that already in that time the Pāramis were counted as ten in Theravāda Buddhism⁴, while the prose passage quoted by Dhammapāla clearly speaks of *dasā Buddhakāra dharmā*.

¹ *Pāramī* or *Pāramitā* means perfect or complete or high title.

² *Carayapitaka'sāḥ* (where vol. p. 7 *Tiṇḍakaṇḍa*) : *ekādaśa Buddhakāra dharmā* a *pāramī* : *ānāpāna* or *ānāpāna*.

³ This is clearly implied in canon, *maṇā* as the 9th *pāramī* (the name *metā pāramī*) and closing the enumeration with *apāramī* occurring after *maṇā*.

The quotations from the *Carivāṇṇa*, the *Jāṭaka-nidāna katha* and the *Carivāṇṇa* commentary presuppose a Canonical text compared with which the P.T.S. edition appears to be incomplete. These quotations fully attest that ten were the *Pāramī* recognized in *Theravāda* Buddhism when the *Carivāṇṇa* was compiled and taken into the corpus of the Pāli Canon along with and as an adjunct to the *Buddhavaṇṇa*. Thus any surmise or conclusion drawn on the basis of the incomplete text of the *Carivāṇṇa* regarding the number of *Pāramī* is apt to be misleading.

These considerations may warrant the statement that when the conception of *Paramitā* developed in Buddhism, the *Theravāda* school counted the *Paramī* as ten while in the Sanskrit works belonging mostly to the *Sarvāstivāda* school, the *Paramī* are counted as six.

The ten *Pāramī*, as enumerated in *Theravāda* are *dāna* (alms-giving), *sīla* (morality), *nekkhamma* (renunciation), *paññā* (wisdom), *vīrya* (energy), *khanti* (forbearance), *sacca* (truth), *adhiṭṭhāna* (resolution), *mettā* (friendliness) and *upekkhā* (indifference). Each of them is practised in three degrees of intensity. And the six *Paramitā* as recognized in Buddhist Sanskrit tradition are *dāna*, *sīla*, *śīla*, *vīrya*, *dhyāna* and *prajñā*. In order to get ten *paramitā*, the following four are to be added viz. *upeya*, *pramuditā*, *bala* and *prāṇa*. A Bodhisattva who has conceived an aspiration to become a Buddha, advances in birth after birth to higher and higher sanctity in the practice of the ten perfections until at last he is born as the Buddha preaching the Law and passing away into the everlasting stillness of *Nirvāṇa* as we find in the *Jāṭakas*. An exactly accomplished Buddha should acquire all these *paramitā*. Each of these *paramitā* may be sub-divided into (1) the ordinary, (2) the inferior and (3) the unlimited perfection of the virtue. Childers is right in agreement with Chough in saying that *dānapāramitā* expresses the duty in general terms and signifies acts of charity or making offerings without any reference to their nature or value (note Childers' Dict., p. 335). A Bodhisattva after having exercised the ten *paramitā* in all the three degrees of their intensity in anterior births was destined to become an omniscient Buddha. Thus we see that the attainment of Buddhahood is the consequence of the vast accumulation of merit in course of the exercise of the

paramitās in previous births. In order to attain Bodhi or enlightenment a Bodhiyattva had to fulfil the ten *paramitās*. He had to undergo several births to fulfil each *paramitā*. In the *Jātakasūdanakathā* we read that these ten *paramitās* are the *Buddhakāraṇa-dhammā* : i. e., the precepts which make one Buddha. The great Śākya prince Siddhārtha before attaining Bodhi found these *paramitās* out to be the only means of attaining Buddhahood. All the previous Buddhas also had to fulfil them in order to attain Buddhahood. Siddhārtha performed these *paramitās*. Bodhiyattva bumedha fulfilled *dāna paramitā* by giving in charity all the worldly things, and his own life; he fulfilled *sīla paramitā* by observing precepts and without taking the least care for his own life, he fulfilled *sakkāmmā paramitā* by renouncing household life like a prisoner always anxious to be released from the prison; he fulfilled *pañña paramitā* by learning whatever he could learn from anybody; he fulfilled *arissā paramitā* by behaving like a lion the king of beasts; he fulfilled *khamā paramitā* by forbearing all the vanities of life most patiently like the earth; he fulfilled *vacca paramitā* by not telling lies for fear of punishment or for temptation or even for the falling of thunder on his head; he fulfilled *adhiṭṭhāna paramitā* by steadfastly adhering to his endeavour to become a Buddha like a mountain unmoved by storm coming from all directions; he fulfilled *mettā paramitā* by cherishing love and friendliness towards his friends and foes alike like water cooling both the virtuous and the sinner; he fulfilled *upekkhā paramitā* by being indifferent to happiness and suffering like the earth (cf. *Jātakasūdanakathā* Vol. I).

A Buddha is called *Dhammakāraṇa* because he is the embodiment of these ten *paramitās*. Dr. Barnett points out that *dāna paramitā* is not an actual deliverance of the world from poverty but an intention for such deliverance; it is a grace of the spirit. Thus purity of the will is the greatest of all virtues and the foundation of all. He further points out that *sīla paramitā* consists essentially in the will to hurt no living creature. (vide the Path of Light, Wisdom of the East Series, p. 98).

As for examples of *dāna paramitā* we may refer to the following in the *Carriyāpiṭaka* — *dharmacariyam* (*dharmajātakasūdanakathā* Vol. IV), *Santhacariyam* (*Santhapala Jātaka Jātaka* Vol. V), *Kuru dhammacariyam* (*Kurudhammā Jātaka Jātaka* Vol. II) *Mahāsud-*

sanacarivam (*Mahāsudassana Jātaka, Jātaka, Vol I*), *Mahāgovindacarivam* (*Mahāgovinda Suttanta, Dīgha Nikāya Vol II*) *Nimurāḍjacarivam* (*Nimurāḍa Jātaka, Jātaka, Vol VI*) *Candakumaracarivam* (*Khaṇḍahāla Jātaka Jātaka, Vol VI*), *Snurāḍjacarivam* (*Sin Jātaka, Jātaka, Vol IV*) *Vessantaracarivam* (*Vessantara Jātaka Jātaka Vol VI*), and *Sassapanditacarivam* (*Sassa Jātaka, Jātaka Vol III*) The following are the instances of *śīla pāramitā* mentioned in the *Carivāṇṇa*, —

Sīlanugācarivam (*Sīlanuga Jātaka Jātaka, Vol I*) *Bhūridattacarivam* (*Bhūridatta Jātaka, Jātaka Vol II*) *Campeyyavandācarivam* (*Campeyya Jātaka Jātaka Vol IV*) *Cūḷabodhicarivam* (*Cūḷabodhi Jātaka Jātaka Vol IV*) *Mahimsarājacarivam* (*Mahisa Jātaka Jātaka Vol II*) *Rururajacarivam* (*Ruru Jātaka Jātaka, Vol IV*) *Māṇḍapacarivam* (*Maṇḍapa Jātaka Jātaka Vol IV*) *Dhammādhāmmadīpaṭṭhacarivam* (*Dhamma Jātaka Jātaka Vol IV*) *Jaradīpīacarivam* (*Jaradīpa Jātaka Jātaka Vol V*), and *Sanhāpālīacarivam* (*Sanhāpala Jātaka Jātaka Vol V*)

The examples of *Nekkhamma pāramitā* can be found in the *Yuddhāṇḍjacarivam* (*Yuddhāṇḍa Jātaka Jātaka, Vol IV*) *Somanassacarivam* (*Somanassa Jātaka Jātaka Vol IV*) *Avogāḥacarivam* (*Avogāha Jātaka Jātaka Vol IV*) *Bhūvacarivam* (*Bhūva Jātaka, Jātaka Vol IV*) *Somanandacarivam* (*Somananda Jātaka, Jātaka, Vol V*) In the *Carivāṇṇa* only one instance of *adhiṭṭhāna pāramitā* is traceable in the *Temurācarivam* which corresponds to the *Temurā Jātaka (Jātaka VI)* which is also known as the *Māggaḍḍha Jātaka* found in the *Jātaka Vol II* As for examples of *sacca pāramitā* we may cite the following —

Kapuvācarivam (*Kapi Jātaka Jātaka Vol II*) *Saccavādhayapanditacarivam* (*Saccavādhya Jātaka Jātaka Vol I*) *Paṭṭapālākarivam* (*Paṭṭa Jātaka Jātaka Vol I*) *Maccharājacarivam* (*Maccha Jātaka, Jātaka, Vol I*) *Kaṇḍalīpāvanacarivam* (*Kaṇḍalīpāvana Jātaka Jātaka Vol IV*) and *Vatasomacarivam* (*Mahāsutasoma Jātaka, Jātaka Vol V*) *Mahāmahāmmacarivam* of the *Carivāṇṇa* which corresponds to the *Lomahama Jātaka* in *Jātaka Vol I*, is the only instance of *Upekkhā pāramitā* *Sūmanassacarivam* (*Sūma Jātaka Jātaka Vol VI*) and *Ehārājacarivam* (*Ehara Jātaka Jātaka Vol III*) are the instances of *Metta pāramitā* as found in the *Carivāṇṇa* The *Carivāṇṇa* is the only work of the Pāli

Canon in which a brief and systematic account of Buddhist *pāramitā* is given although references are found scattered here and there in the *Pali Nikāyas*

The Mahāvāna Buddhist texts are replete with information regarding the fulfilment of *pāramitā* by the Bodhisattva. In the *Saddhopāśasātra*, Asvaghosa points out that the Bodhisattvas know that the nature of the *dharma* is the perfection of spotless charity, and they being free from covetousness, practice *dāna pāramitā*. They know that the nature of the *dharma* being free from the influence of five sensual pleasures and being free from immorality is the perfection of stainless morality and they being far above all these vices, practice *sīla pāramitā*. They know that the nature of the *dharma* is the perfection of stainless patience, and they being free from malice practice *kṣānti pāramitā*. They know that the nature of the *dharma* is the perfection of pure energy, they being free from indulgence, practice *vīrya pāramitā*. They know that the nature of the *dharma* having nothing to do with disturbance and confusion is the perfection of pure tranquillisation they practice *dhyāna pāramitā*. They know that the nature of the *dharma* is the perfection of pure wisdom they being free from darkness of ignorance practice *prajñā pāramitā* (cf. The Awakening of Faith in the Mahāvāna by Suzuki, pp. 122—123 vide also outlines of Mahāvāna Buddhism by Suzuki p. 69)

Thus we see that the *pāramitā* are the excellences of a Bodhisattva who never gets tired of practising the ten virtues of perfection. A Bodhisattva in order to obtain Bodhi or enlightenment has to fulfil ten *pāramitā* (*pāramitā*). The *Jātakamālā*¹ the *Mahāvastu*² and the *Saddhopāśasātra*³ contain instances of *pāramitā*. The idea of *pāramitā* is similar according to Northern and Southern Schools of Buddhism with slight variations as noticed above.

We may agree with Dr. Barua in thinking that the Pāramitā doctrine had its root in the age-old Indian conception of faith (*saddhā*) particularly as developed in a Sutta of the *Mahāvāna-*

¹ It contains 75 birth stories ten of which have the same titles as those of the *Cā vipāśakā* tales.

² e.g. *Tibetan Jātaka* and *Mahāvastu Samyuktam*.

³ e.g. Sources of *Bh. Sa. A. Sutra* *Tattvapada* *Rasa* and *Sutrasa*.

Nikaya and that as it is its main importance lies in its bearing on the problem of evolution of personality, whether of the *Buddha* type, or of the *Sāvaka* or of the *Parikkhabuddha*.¹ The Pāli book entitled *Apadāna* contains copious illustrations of how the *Sāvaka-pāramī* was attained by a large number of men and women as the ripe result of their age-long efforts. In heightening the importance of the moral excellence of Buddhist personalities the doctrine had necessarily to lay stress on the prolonged character of strivings, and in doing so it destroyed the belief in the immediate prospects held out by Gotama and transferred the possibility of final fruition to an indefinitely long date.²

¹ B. M. Barua, *Faith in Buddhism* (New & Luddhiana Studies, pp. 3-9 ff.) and *Mahāyāna in the Making* (*Proceedings of the Second Oriental Conference*).

² Barua, *Mahāyāna in the Making* (*Proceedings of the Second Oriental Conference*).

CHAPTER III

JĀTI

(Caste)

Jāti is the generally accepted Indian term to denote caste. *Varna* is another term to denote the same. In Pali we meet with the term *jātibhanga* or *jātibheda* used in the sense of caste distinction. But the term *jātiśūdra* is used to signify the tradition built up by a family or a race or a school. The problem of caste was approached by the Buddhists from three different points of view — (1) biological (2) occupational and (3) cultural. (1) As a biological term *jāti* conveys the same meaning as *śūdra* or genus. The main criterion of genera is that they are mutually exclusive in the sense that sexual union for the purpose of procreation is not possible between them. Each genus consists of a number of species bearing some common characteristics, e.g. the two main divisions of the genus plant are represented by grass (*trasa*) and trees (*vaḷḷaka*). The difference between grasses and trees lies in the fact that the former are pathless without and are pithy without (*anupphaggāni bahuvāṇa*, *Sutta Nipata Commentary* II p. 464) and the latter are just the opposite (*bahupphaggā antovāṇā*). The palm trees, coconut trees and the rest judged by the above characteristics come under the class „grass. The insects, the flies, the ants form three different genera while the hive, the cat, and the rest form a class by themselves. The genus bird too may be thus shown to consist of various species. The similarity of bodily forms, habit of life and the like is a common characteristic of the species belonging to the same genus. If this be applied as a test of difference of genera among men, the Buddhists argue that human beings cannot be taken to represent any more than one species as between a brahmin and a member of any other caste there is absolutely no difference to be noticed in respect of bodily forms (*Sutta N.* verses 608—611) the habit of life and the rest. Further sexual union for the purpose of procreation is possible between any two human beings if they are male and female. The

upshot of the biological argument employed by the Buddhists is that the Brahmins the Kāśtriyas, the Vāśyās and the Śūdras do not represent *jāti* in the sense of species. They all belong to one and the same species. Thus according to the Buddhists, it cannot be maintained that a brahmin is a brahmin by birth. It is claimed that if both father and mother be persons of high social status, and both of them be persons of high moral character, the progeny born of them will be of a higher type of human beings. The Buddhists hold that the accident of birth cannot invariably determine the quality or potentiality of the progeny. A brahmin is a brahmin by qualities and not by accident of birth. (*Evam sante na jātyā brāhmano gacchati pana brāhmano hoti Sutta N. Commentary, II 464—466*)

(2) Failing to establish caste distinction (*Jātibheda*) on a biological ground the Buddhists proceed to discuss whether and how far the distinction can be justified on occupational ground.

With them the distinction mainly rests on a difference in occupations of life. He who among men lives by cultivation is a cultivator he who lives by handicraft is an artisan he who lives by trade is a trader he who lives by earning wages is a labourer he who lives by theft is a thief he who lives by waging war is a warrior he who lives by acting as a *puṇakūla* is a priest and he who lives by governing a kingdom is a king (*Sutta Nipata* verses 612—619).¹ Thus the position taken up by the Buddhists may be reduced to

¹ Yo hi loke manussesa *vekkham* upajīvā
 evam Vāsettha jātibho kassako so na brāhmano
 Yo hi loke manussesa pītho vpiena jātī
 evam Vāsettha jātibho appako so na brāhmano
 Yo hi loke manussesa vohāraṃ upajāti
 evam Vāsettha jātibho vāpi so na brāhmano
 Yo hi loke manussesa purapavasa jātī
 evam Vāsettha jātibho pāsako so na brāhmano
 Yo hi loke manussesa adinam upajātī
 evam Vāsettha jātibho caru so na brāhmano
 Yo hi loke manussesa bhuttam upajātī
 evam Vāsettha jātibho vedhapi so na brāhmano
 Yo hi loke manussesa purudasa jātī
 evam Vāsettha jātibho vāpako so na brāhmano
 Yo hi loke manussesa jānam ratthā ca bhūjātī
 evam Vāsettha jātibho rājo so na brāhmano

thus that the social status of a person is determined and determinable by means of occupation or livelihood (*Kammānu*)

(3) *Jāti* as a cultural term is entertained by the Buddhists as a mainstay of man's virtue. *Jāti* as an arrogant feeling which impels a man to look down upon other fellow beings is severely criticised but *jāti* as a moral or cultural tradition is highly valued. Each class of men by following a course of good conduct builds up a tradition for itself which has a high value in life as an incentive to betterment of the race and as a check to moral degradation. The tradition awakens in men self-consciousness which is essential to moral progress. The defiance of the cultural tradition thus built up leads to man's fall. (*Jātiṇaṃ suvantaṃ kammānu socaṃ upagamaṃ — Sutta Nipata* verse 315)

With the Buddhists *jāti* was also a term to denote the moral disposition of a person. The *Ājñāka* divided human beings into six main types according to six such dispositions, each disposition being expressed in terms of a colour. *Kāṇṭhābhijāti* (of a black disposition), *Lohitābhijāti* (of a red disposition), *haliddābhijāti*¹ (of a yellow disposition) and the like. The *Mahāvastu* substitutes *varṇa* for *abhijāti* the Pali *saṃsārahijātiyo* being the same expression as the Sanskrit *saṃsāra-varṇa*. The word *jāti* is used in Pali in the sense of *saṃhava* *saṃsāra-jāti* signifying a person of a boisterous nature. In the Edicts of Asoka the word *jāti* has been used precisely in the sense of moral trait or disposition. These traits be not mine — is to be wished for (*ete jāti na kareṇa mamañi*) — Separate Rock Edict no. I. Envy, quick loss of temper, cruelty, impatience, want of application, laziness and lethargy are mentioned as specific examples of such *jāti*. Going by this text the abiding moral trait or disposition is the real determining factor of racial or personal type.

With the Brahmanists, the caste system is of a divine origin. It devolved as though from the very beginning of creation out of the created form of *Nārāyaṇa* himself. According to the Buddhist *Aśāśā* sutta² the entire social order including the state and the

¹ *Asaṅga's Nikāya* III p. 94.

caste divisions developed gradually among men according to social needs. The *sutta* repudiates the divine origin of both the state and social order. According to this Buddhist *sutta* the caste distinctions had originated in differences in occupations or means of livelihood. In other words, it is the class which afterwards hardened into caste. All the arguments of the Buddhists against the Brahmanic theory of caste which he scattered in different Pāli *suttas* have been summed up in the concluding chapter of the *Dharmapala* (Chap. 37). The *Dharmapala* opens: Just as thoughtless children while playing about on a high road heap up dust and sand in different shapes and christened them saying: this is milk, this is curd, this is meat and this is ghee: just so it and the four *Varnas* as expounded by the Brahmins.¹

The arguments in the *Vasalla* *sutta* are re-stated more effectually in the *Dharmapala*. The biological classification of living beings according to genera and species (*linga* and *jāti*) may be made and maintained on the ground of similarity or difference in bodily forms, habit and other characteristics, but the application of biological test cannot be established that human beings belong to species more than one. As a matter of fact there is one species among men, all of them possessing common characteristics (*ekajāta nīlā kula samsamānyana prithagandha* *Dharmapala* 625). The Brāhmanas, the Kētriyas, the Vaiśyas and the Śūdras are all names arbitrarily fixed. A name so fixed has no special connotation of its own. Suppose four sons are born in a family and their father chooses to call one: *Mandata* (gladdener), one *Jivaka* (the living), one *Aśoka* (sorrowless) and one *Sataya* (the long lived). It cannot be deduced from these names that one who is called *Mandata* is actually the person who gladdens, one who is called *Jivaka* is actually the person who lives, one who is called *Aśoka* is actually the person who is free from sorrow, and one who is called *Sataya* is actually the person who lives a hundred years. There are certain distinctive moral, intellectual or occupational traits acquired or developed by

¹ *Yathā hi vāpālā bhikkhū āramāṇā n chāpāthā*

pāmasapūjanā anupindā saraṇā nānāni karuṇā

idān bhikkhūn idān dāṭhā dān mūlānā idān gāṇṇā

na ca bhikkhū āramāṇā pāmasā n saraṇā bhāṇā hi

varuṇā satthānā satthānā yathā brāhmanā bhikkhūn (Dharmapala p. 625)

different persons as they grow up in life but these distinctive traits cannot be predicated of persons because of their birth in a certain home and by the union of certain parents (*Dīṣṣāvalāna* pp 609—630) The differences that exist among men are primarily individual in character The degree of difference in moral, intellectual and occupational qualities which may be shown to exist between a so-called Brahmin and a so-called *śūdra* may equally be shown to exist between two sons born of the same parents According to time honoured customs of India a Brahmin is allowed to marry from all the four castes a *Kṣatriya* from three a *Vaiśya* from two and a *śūdra* from one only, which is his own caste Thus a Brahmin may be the father of four sons by his four wives from different castes the son gaining the social status of his mother There is no invariable law that given equal chances the son by the Brahmin mother will excel one born by the *śūdra* mother The status of the four sons is determined arbitrarily

It is claimed that the Brahmin is generated from the mouth of Brahmā the *Kṣatriya* from the thigh the *Vaiśya* from the navel, and the *śūdra* from the feet This is only an allegory, which is not suggestive of any congenital difference between a Brahmin and a *Kṣatriya* between a *Kṣatriya* and a *Vaiśya* or between a *Vaiśya* and a *śūdra* The allegory rather suggests that the difference had originated in the difference in the training and occupation That is to say, it is the *karṇa* which determines the difference among men in social status There is no such certitude that a Brahmin will be reborn after his death in the *brahmaloka* because he is a Brahmin and a *śūdra* will be reborn in a lower world because he is a *śūdra* The destiny of each person is individually determined by his good or bad deeds

At the time of the Buddha Gautama there were four classes of the people viz *Kṣatriyas*, *Brahmanas*, *Veśyas* and *Suddas* They were known as *cattaro varṇā* or the four castes *Varṇa* literally means colour, some translate it as appearance In the Buddhist books ¹ *Kṣatriyas* have been given preference over the *Brahmanas* whereas in the Brahmin literature the *Brahmanas* occupy the first place The *Upanishads* speak of the *Kṣatriya* superiority and in the

¹ Cf. *Indriya Saṅgāhikā* D 9. I. *Indriya Saṅgāhikā* of D 9. III. *Latthantara* ch. III

Chāndogya the superior learning of the *Khattiyas* is frequently referred to. Of these four castes the *Khattiyas* and the *Brāhmanas* have been given precedence in salutation, homage, obeisance and the due ministry.¹ The Buddha did not lay much stress on the caste distinctions which he said were unscientific. In the *Ambaṭṭha Sutta* the Buddha is said to have refuted the charge of Ambaṭṭha by saying that the *Sakya*s among whom he was born were not menials but *Khattiyas* and that Ambaṭṭha, a *Kāshyapa* *Brāhmana*, was a descendant of a slave girl. Moreover he tried to prove that the *Khattiyas* were superior to the *Brāhmanas*.

Khattiya is the lord of the fields. This term means a 'Rājā' which is taken in the sense of a nobleman. There are good and bad nobles. A bad noble deprives a living being of life, is a thief, is unchaste, speaks lies, slanders, uses rough words, is greedy, malevolent, and holds wrong views. A good noble, on the other hand, abstains from murder, theft, unchastity, lying, slandering, gossiping, greed, malevolence and false opinions (*Aggaṅṇa Sutta*, *Dīgha N*). It is distinctly stated that the *Khattiyas* are the best of the four classes (cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, 358 SN I 153, II 284 and *Aggaṅṇa Sutta*).² A son born of a Brāhmin maiden by a Kshatriya youth was eligible for receiving seat and water as tokens of great respect from the *Brāhmanas* for partaking of the feast offered to the dead or of the food boiled in milk, or of the offerings to gods, or of the food sent as a present for learning the sacred verses of the *Brāhmanas* and marrying *Brāhmana* girls. But he was not allowed to receive the consecration ceremony of a Kshatriya because he was not of pure descent on his mother's side. The same privileges could also be enjoyed by one born of a Kshatriya maiden by a *Brāhmana* youth (*Ambaṭṭha Sutta*, *Dīgha N I*). It should be noted that if a Kshatriya was outlawed by other Kshatriyas, he was eligible for enjoying all the privileges mentioned above from the hands of the *Brāhmanas*. So we find that even when a Kshatriya had fallen into

¹ *Vaggaṃ Aṭṭhitaṃ Vātaṃ no ya — Uṭṭhāro ve mahābhāṇa vasaṃ — Aṭṭhitaṃ Brāhmaṇaṃ Ivaṃ Suddaṃ Iti esam āha manārāṇaṃ catummāsaṃ anuṇṇaṃ dve vassa aṇṇaṃ addhārenti — Khattiyā eva bhūṭaṃ anuraṇṇaṃ vā rāḍḍam attheti ābhāṇapāṇaṃ catummāsaṃ palikkamānāṃ I ti bhikkhavaṃ so*

² *Khattiyaṃ suttāṇaṃ paṇe tasmā ya galāpapaṭṭhānaṃ vjāṇanāsaṃparāṇaṃ so vettittha dhammānaṃ*

the deepest degradation it held good that the *Ksatriyas* were superior and the *Brāhmanas* inferior (Cf. *Majjhima Nikāya* I 358)

Next we take up the case of the Brahmins who were proud of their caste. It happened that a Brahmin out of homage partook of the leavings of food from the man of the lowest caste but as soon as he had eaten, he thought that he had disgraced his birth, his clan and his family because he had taken the leavings of a churl. His remorse was so very keen that he plunged into the jungle not to show his face to the human world, where he died forlorn (*Jāt*, II 57)

The Brahmins were so very proud of their caste that in one instance we find that a Brahmin when he grew old said to his son thus: 'Don't let my body be burnt in a cemetery where any outcaste can be burnt, but find some uncontaminated place to burn me in' (*Jāt*, Cowell, II 17)

The Pāli literature mentions the following kinds of *Brāhmanas*: (1) *Uddāśīna Brāhmanas*, i.e. Brahmins who lived in the Northern or North-western country (*Jāt* I 178 210 240, 263) (2) *Kāśī Brāhmanas* i.e. Brahmins who lived at Kāśī (*Jāt* II, 50 59 115), (3) *Brāhmanas of Rājagṛha and Māgadha* who were very superstitious holding false views and believing in luck (*Jāt* I 215) (4) *Brāhmanas of Bhaddadāya Gotta* (Vide *Tevijja Sutta* *Dīgha Nikāya*, I), and (5) *Kāṇḍavyana Brāhmanas*¹. It is one of the famous sayings of the Buddhists —

Foremost in virtue were the men of old
Those brahmins who remembered ancient rules
In them well-guarded were the doors of sense
They had achieved the mastery of wrath
In meditation and the Norm they took delight
Those brahmins who remembered ancient rules

(*S N Sālvatana-vagga* 'Book of the
Kindred Sayings', IV, p. 74)

Brahmins in name there were many but real Brahmins could hardly be found. The *Jātaka* relates a story of the dearth of good and real *Brāhmanas* (*Jāt* Cowell IV 227). In it is given a descrip-

¹ *Manṭānaṃ kaṭṭhā manṭānaṃ paratṭhā* — makers of mantras and repetition of mantras. *Dīgha* I 230

greed among the greedy. He must not utter harsh words. He should not foster desire for this world or for the next. He is a Brāhmana who has risen above ties and who is free from sin or impurity. He is pure, serene, undisturbed and bright like the moon. He has abandoned all desires and has conquered all the world. His passions are extinct. He is noble, a hero, a great sage, a conqueror, the accomplished and the awakened. He is perfect in knowledge and he is truly a sage. (Vide *Brāhmanasagga Dhammapada*, pp. 50—60. Cf. *Vāṣiṣṭha Sūtra* of the *Sūtra Nipāṭa*, *Brāhmana Sūtra* of the *M N*, the *Brāhmana Samyutta* of the *S N*, the *Jaṃṇasana Sūtra* of the *A N* and so forth.) A true Brahman is he who is immune from the assaults of perception and who has no craving to be reborn either here or elsewhere. He dwells with a clear conscience and without any perplexity.

It is clear, says T. W. Rhys Davids, that the word Brahman in the opinion of the early Buddhists conveyed to the minds of the people an exalted meaning, a connotation of real veneration and respect. He further points out that "If the contention of the Buddhists had been universally accepted, and if the word Brahman had come to mean, not only a man of a virtuous descent, but exclusively a man of a certain character and insight, then the present caste system of India could never have grown up. The social supremacy of the Brāhmanas by birth became accepted as an uncontroversial fact and the inflow of popular superstition which overwhelmed the Buddhist movement, overwhelmed also the whole pantheon of the Vedic gods. Buddhism and Brahmanism alike passed practically away, and modern Hinduism arose on the ruins of both." (*Dialogues of the Buddha*, pt. I, pp. 140-599.) It is one of the injunctions of the Buddha that every one having certain abilities should be allowed to teach and that if he does teach, he should teach all, keeping nothing back and shutting no one out (Introduction to the *Lohicca Sūtra*, *ibid.* 265). It appears from this that a teacher belonging to a higher caste would not refuse to teach anybody belonging to an inferior caste. It is interesting to note that the Brāhmanas at first gave themselves up to meditation. Hence they were called *Jhāyaka*s. But some people, being incapable of enduring meditation in forest leaf-huts, engaged themselves in writing books; hence they were called *Ajāyaka*s, or the repeaters of the Vedas.

The Brahmins had their fivefold code for achieving the ideal. This code consists of (1) The Truth (*sacca*) (2) Austerities (*tapas*) (3) Chastity (*brahmacariya*) (4) Study (of Vedic lore) and Munificence (*dāga*) — i.e., to the Brahmins (Lord Chalmers, *Further Dialogues of the Buddha* I p. vii).

Service was divided into four by the Brāhmanas: service of a Brahman, of a noble, of a middle class man, and of a peasant. Any member of all four classes might serve a Brahman. A noble might be served by another noble or by a middle class man or by a peasant. A middle class man might be served by another middle-class man or by a peasant, and a peasant might be served only by a peasant. The Buddha refuted this selfish classification of the Brahmins and based his contention on moral and ethical grounds alone. In the opinion of the Buddha, one should not assert that all services are to be rendered or that all services are to be refused. If the service makes one bad and not good, it should not be rendered. But if it makes him better and not worse, then it should be rendered. This is the guiding consideration which should decide the conduct of Brahmins, nobles, middleclass men and peasants. The Buddha further points out that lineage does not enter into a man's living either good or bad (*Esakari Sutta* of *M N*, *Further Dialogues of the Buddha*, II p. 100).

It appears from the comparative frequency of the discussions on the matter of Brahmin pretensions, that the subject of caste was a burning problem at the time of the composition of the *Nikāyas*. No other social problem is referred to so often, and the Brahmins would not be so often represented as expressing astonishment or indignation at the position taken up regarding it by the early Buddhists unless there had really been a serious difference on the subject between the two schools. But the difference, though real, has been gravely misunderstood. As Rhys Davids has said: "The disastrous effects from the ethical, social and political points of view of these restrictions and of caste as a whole have been often grossly exaggerated and the benefits of the system ignored. And we are entirely unwarranted in supposing the system as it now exists, to have been in existence also at the time when Buddhism arose in the valley of the Ganges. Our knowledge of the actual facts of caste even as it now exists is still confused and inaccurate. The theories

put forward to explain the facts are loose and irreconcilable.¹ There was a common phrase current among the people which divided all the world into four *varṇas* (colours or complexions). The priests put themselves first and had a theological legend in support of their contention. But it is clear from the *Pitakas* that this was not admitted by the nobles. And it is also clear that no one of these divisions was a caste. There was neither *commensalism* nor *commensality* between all members of one *varṇa*; nor was there a governing council for each.

The fourth was distinguished from the other by social position. And though in a general rough way the classification corresponded to the actual facts of life, there were innumerable gradations within the four classes and the boundary between them was both variable and undefined. The theory of caste or *Jāti* easily breaks down when we see that a Brahman and a *Candala* do not differ from their physical constitution and can procreate children.

Mahākaccāna was asked by King *Avantiputta* of Madhura as to the Brahmanical claim that the Brahmins were superior to all other castes. The king said: The Brahmins maintain that they alone form the superior class, all other classes being inferior. The Brahmins alone form the white class, all other classes being black. That purity resides in Brahmins alone and not in non-Brahmins; and that Brahmins are Brahmi's legitimate sons born from his mouth, offspring of his creations of his and his heirs. *Kaccāna* convinced him of the equal footing of all the four classes inasmuch as any member of the four classes could, when he had grown rich and wealthy, employ any member of any of the other three classes as servants.

The emptiness of the Brahman claim to superiority is shown by the fact that if any one, be he a noble Brahman, Vessa or Sudda, kills, robs, slanders, covets, harbours all will in of butter treague, or has a wrong outlook, he after death must pass to a state of misery or woe, or to purgatory. The same misery awaits each one who is guilty of such crimes. It is also demonstrated by the fact that if any one, be he a noble, a middle class man or a peasant, abstains from the crimes noted above, he passes after death to bliss and

¹ *Discussions of the Suttas*, pt. I, pp. 106-107.

heaven. It can further be proved by the fact that if any one be he a Brahman a noble a middle class man or a peasant is a burglar thief or house breaker, he is equally punished by the ruler of the realm irrespective of the caste of the accused. It is also apparent from the fact that he, whether Brahman Vessa or Sudda who cuts off his hair and beard, and dons the yellow robes and goes from house to house as a pilgrim abstaining from killing stealing and lying eating but one meal a day and living the higher life in virtue and goodness, such a one is honoured and respected and provided with all the necessities of life. (*Madhura Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* II pp 83—90 cp *Avakāśana Sutta* *M N* II pp 147 foll, and *Esakāśa Sutta* *M N*, II, pp 177 foll where the Brahman pretensions are also discussed) Thus we find that the *Madhura Sutta* deals with caste system under five heads. It teaches that caste cannot ensure material success in life cannot save the wicked from punishment hereafter cannot debar the good from bliss hereafter cannot shield the evil-doers from criminal law and cannot affect the uniform veneration extended to the monk, whether he be sprung from the highest or the lowest of the four castes. In all those important respects the four castes are equal. Lord Chalmers is right in pointing out that this *sutta* does not go on to state nor does any other *sutta* venture to state, that in every possible respect the four castes were on one identical footing of equality. Such a statement would have evinced a certain blindness to facts for although in all essentials caste was not an empty name to the Buddha yet the distinctions of caste had a residual sphere of activity and ranked among the accidents of life. Whilst caste had no part in the higher life and was irrelevant in the less trivial of mundane relations yet there undoubtedly remained the region where in the absence of higher qualifications the hereditary distinctions of caste were accepted as an appropriate differentia between little men. But into this trivial region Gautama disdained to enter. He was content to explode the caste theory without denouncing it as a formal institution (*Ind J R I S*, 1894, p 348).

Brahman wives of Brāhmanas have their periods and they are subject to conception. How then can the Brahmins claim to be born of Brāhmā's mouth? In the Yonakamboja and other adjacent countries, there are only two classes, masters and slaves. A master

can become a slave and *vice versa*. This does not at all lend any support to the Brahmin's claim. It is clear therefore, that the caste system of the Brahmins did not prevail in the Yonakamboja region.

Not only a Brahmin but a man of other three classes can develop in his heart the love that knows no hate or ill. Not only a Brahmin, but a man of other three classes also can go down to the river with his string of red bath balls to shampoo himself and rub off the dust and dirt. The fire kindled by any one of the four classes blazes up with a bright flame and serves the purpose of a fire. When a son is born to a young noble and a Brahmin maiden, he is styled both a noble and a Brahmin; when a son is born to a noble maiden and a young Brahmin, he is styled both a Brahmin and a noble. Between two virtuous Brahmins, where, of whom one is an educated scholar and the other not educated, Brahmins generally give preference to the educated one in making gifts; but if the educated one is wicked and profligate and the uneducated one is virtuous, the Brahmins generally give preference to the uneducated man. Therefore the standard of distinction between *varas* and *janas* depends on purity and goodness (cp. *Issakanyasutta*, *M N* II 147—157). Here also we find that the Buddha speaks against the Brahmanical pretensions that the Brahmins are superior to all other castes (cf. *Alp Cūḍa Sutta* II 164, 177 where also the Buddha condemns the Brahmanical pretensions as to their superiority).

In the 6th or 5th century B.C. the Brahmins took up higher occupations to earn their livelihood. They acted as chaplains (*Jātaka* IV 188), ministers¹ and courtiers (*Jāt* II 166). The Brahmins also followed such lower professions as hunters (*Jāt* II 14, III, 276), who used to kill many deer and live on them; carpenters (*Jāt* IV 126) who used to bring wood from the forest and make carts; goatherds (*Jāt* III 242) and snake-charmers (*Jāt* IV 283).

We find many instances of greediness of the Brahmins in Buddhist literature. The Brāhmanas thought covantly of large sums of money and large supplies of food. They sought in the dreams of kings pretexts for sacrifices and personal gain (*Jāt* I 187 cf. *Jāt* I 255, where the Brāhmanas are described as a greedy lot). The

¹ It should be noted that the Kṣatriya also enjoyed the privilege of being ministers to the king (*Jātaka* III 102).

Buddha, while at Jetavana, spoke about a Brahman retained by the King of Kosala who had the power of telling which words were lucky, but who was very greedy. The Brahman made it a rule only to commend the work of those smiths who gave him presents, while he rejected the work of those who did not bribe him (*Jat* I, 277). A Brahman who was appointed as a judge by the King of Benares was addicted to accepting bribes (*Jat* VI 69).

The Brahman students like the Ksatryas, were admitted into the University of Taxila. They were like the Ksatryas taught the three Vedas and various arts (*Jat* III 105).

The Vessas were the trading people. In the Buddhist literature their position was next to the Brāhmanas (cf. *Aggañña Sutta*, *Dīgha Nikāya* III). They adopted the married state and set on foot various trades. The Jñākas contain references to such trading people and trading families (cf. *Jat* II 16., 199).

The Suddas come next to the Vessas. They were known in the Buddhist age as slaves as opposed to freemen. Children born to such slaves were also slaves. We hear of them quite occasionally as domestic servants in the houses of the rich (*Jat* (Fau-bull) IV 200). According to the *Aggañña Sutta*, those who took to hunting and such degrading pursuits were known as Suddas (the lowest grade of folk.) *Vāsābhakkhatti* a daughter of a slave girl who became the consort of the king of Kosala, was degraded, together with her son *Vidūvabha* because they were of servile rank (*Jat* I 27 and see also *Jat* IV 91). It is interesting to note that the name of a noble family should not be given to a slave girl's bastard child. It happened that a chaplain fell in love with a slave girl who conceived and enquired of him as to the name by which the child should be called. The chaplain replied thus: My dear here is a tree called *Uddāla*, and you may name the child as *Uddāla*. It can never be that the name of a noble family should be given to a bastard child of a slave girl (*Jat* IV p. 188).

Besides these four classes there were lower classes such as *candālas* *puṭṭhavas* *caras*, *senādas*, *vaṭṭakaras* potters, weavers, leather workers, barbers, matmakers, fishermen, drummers (*akara-vāḍas* *śūlas* *Jat* I 146) conchblowers (*vaṭṭhaddhamaṭṭakūṭas* *Jat* I 147) ploughmen or cultivators (*Jat* I 166) greengrocers, carters, water-carriers, field-labourers (*Jat* III 107) etc. It is true that

the *śūdras* the *śūddras* and the *śākhāras* were undoubtedly aboriginal tribesmen who were hereditary craftsmen. So also in the case of matmakers, potters, weavers, leather-workers and water-carriers who adopted low occupations from generation to generation undoubtedly all these were *kīṇaśāḍīya* or low caste people. In the Buddhist age a barber was rewarded by the King with a village (*Jāt* I, 30). A true believing barber was allowed to listen to the Master's discourse and enter the *Saṅgha*. It appears from this that there was no bar for a man of lower *varṇa* to come to listen to the Buddha's *dharma* (*Jāt* II, 4).

Mention is made of a *caṇḍāla* village which was inhabited by low-caste *caṇḍālas* only (*Jāt* IV, 124). There was a belief in Buddha's time that the *caṇḍālas* used to bring bad luck to those who saw them (*Jāt* IV, 235). The *caṇḍālas* had their own manner of speech and their own language. There was a *caṇḍāla* village outside Ujjeni (*Jāt* IV, 244). The *caṇḍālas* were not admitted into the University of Taxila. Two *caṇḍāla* brothers went to study at Taxila, posing as Brahmins but when they were found out they were expelled (*Jāt* IV, 244). The *caṇḍālas* were so much hated by the Brahmins that some among them on account of having tasted the food of a *caṇḍāla* were put out of caste (*Jāt* IV, 235). A *caṇḍāla* is described as having been able to secure as he wished, the beautiful lady *Ditthamaṅgalikā* daughter of a prosperous merchant. The lady was kept in the *caṇḍāla* settlement outside the city without transgressing in any way the rules of caste. A son of this beautiful lady, when he was seven or eight years old learned the three Vedas and at sixteen practised charities to the Brahmins (*Jāt* IV, 235). There is an instance where we find how a wise and learned *caṇḍāla* was badly treated by a *Brāhmana* (*Jāt* III, 153).

A young Brahmin learnt a charm from a low caste *caṇḍāla*. When once asked by the King as to the name of the teacher from whom he had learnt it he felt shame to say that he had learnt it from a low-caste *caṇḍāla* and spoke falsely before the King. Instantly the charm was gone. The Brahmin spoke to the King the truth. Hearing this the King thought within himself "When one has a treasure to prickles what has birth to do with it?"

According to the Buddha people belonging to high or low caste could attain arhatship. There are instances in the Pāli literature

where we find that a ploughman or a cultivator attained arahatship (*Jāt* I, 168) a fisherman's son was admitted into the order and he afterwards won the glory of arahatship (*Jāt* I, 105) A careful study of the *Theragāthā* and its commentary will convince one of the fact that people belonging to different castes, from the highest aristocracy to the lowest scavenger lived together in fraternal affection and equanimity and won the highest bliss (see my *History of Pāli Literature* pp 500 full) Any person belonging to the lower caste, as for example *candala* was not eligible for kungship. A *candala* simply because he was a *candala* was not made a *kung*. It was distinctively stated that had he been of a higher caste he would have been made a *kung* (*Jāt* III 18)

At the time of the Buddha we meet with several instances where marriage took place among the candidates of equal rank. A gentleman of a country near Sāvatti asked in marriage for his son a young Sāvattiyan girl of equal rank (*Jāt* I 124) A Brahman was married to a bride of his own rank (*Jāt* I, 202) The daughter of a lay sister at Sāvatti was married to a husband of the same caste (*Jāt* I 294) A Buddha had a beautiful daughter when she grew up she was married into a family 'as good as her own' (*Jāt* II 158) A Brahman householder of Benares had a son and a daughter when the son grew up his father brought a wife home for him from a family of equal rank (*Jāt* III 106) There is an example of a-caste marriage (marriage outside one's caste) in the case of the daughter of the chief gulfand maker of Sāvatti, named Mallikā marrying Pasenadi the King of Kosala (*Jāt* III 244)

Gahapati, or householder may be found among the classes already mentioned. In the Pāli literature the word *Kasambhū* occurs (*Jāt* I 105 *Jāt* II, 266) which means a landowner (and a country squire) It may refer to a landowner belonging to any caste, but in the case of Brāhmanas the term *Brāhmanagahapati*, or 'Brahman householders' occurs in several places in Pāli literature for example *Amagga Brāhmanagahapatika pa* in *Jāt* I p 506 (Fourball)

CHAPTER IV

ARIYASACCAS

(*Four Noble Truths*)

In the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda doctrines the *Ariyasaccas* or Four Noble Truths are regarded as the quintessence of Buddhism as propounded by the Master himself. It is categorically asserted in the *Piṭakopadesa*¹ that all that was uttered by the Buddha from the day of his enlightenment to that of his great decease—all that he propounded in the form of a *sutta* or a *śūtra* or a *vyākaraṇa* or a *gāthā* or an *uttāra*—all fall within the scope of the Four Noble Truths.

The Sutta which embodies them in their authoritative form is known as the *Dhammacakkapavattana Sutta*. This Sutta is entertained by tradition as Pāṭhaka Dhammasakkā and of the very first public statement of Buddha's position as a teacher and thinker. There is little doubt that the text of this discourse is highly important in the history of Buddhism as a definite formulation of Buddha's doctrine from the orthodox point of view. The *Avasthās* as generally interpreted consist of the following four items of truth: (1) *Dukkha* commonly translated as suffering; (2) *Dukkha-samudaya* commonly translated as origin of suffering; (3) *Dukkha-nirodha* cessation of suffering; and (4) *Dukkha-nirodha-gaṇi-paṭipada* the path leading to the cessation of suffering. Birth, decay, death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair are mentioned as common instances of suffering as generally understood in the world in which we live. Union with persons or things a person does not like or separation from persons or things a person likes is said to be suffering from the mental point of view. To put it in another form, suffering is a painful feeling which arises from getting what one does not desire to get and not getting what one desires to get² in short from disappointment. The entire position taken

¹ *Ye āhāsi buddhismam bhagavāto aśāmanasā bhāṣe* *Naṃsā śāstāsi bhaddhā tatra vāḥ satta avasthāsāṃ sa prajñāyāsi* (ibid. I).

In the texts the negative statement alone is considered to be sufficient.

up in respect of the first item is reduced to this "*Saṃkhittena pañcupadanakkhaṇḍa dukkhā*", 'the five aggregates of attachment constitute suffering

In the traditional exposition each of the terms birth, death and the rest, is carefully defined. Birth is defined as a particular biological process of development of an individual in a certain species of living beings. Decay is defined as a biological process of infirmity along with the maturity attained by an individual in a particular form of birth. Death is defined as a tragic biological end of an individual in life, resulting from the arrest of vital functions. Sorrow is defined as a mental process of grieving due to the sense of a great loss either of kinsmen or of wealth or of health or of character or of a cherished belief. Lamentation is defined as a verbal expression of sorrow felt in the heart. Pain is defined as bodily uneasiness or discomfort. Misery is nothing but a mental uneasiness or disagreeable feeling. Despair consists in utter dejection of spirit resulting from the sense of great loss beyond recovery. By association is meant contact coming together union and mixing with. Further explanation follows which tends to show that birth or decay or death is not in itself suffering. Suffering arises from a sense of disappointment. A person for instance wishes may it be that I shall not be subject to the contingency of birth, but the contingency actually arises in spite of his wishes to the contrary. Thus the question of suffering is inwardly bound up with man's wish or desire in regard to certain things. All such things in connection with which his wish or desire comes into play are summed up by the five aggregates of attachment.

Thus from the consideration of the first item of truth one is led to the second concerning the origin of suffering.

The origin of suffering lies in *Taṇhā* defined as craving which is potent for rebirth accompanied by lust and self-indulgence seeking satisfaction now here and now there. There are three kinds of craving (1) the craving for pleasures of the senses (2) the craving for becoming and (3) the craving for not-becoming.

From the consideration of the second item one is left to consider the third concerning the cessation of suffering. The cessation of suffering consists in utter fading away and attenuation of that very craving. *Anodha* is cessation without any possibility of rebirth.

The term *dukkha* is taken in Buddhism in a most comprehensive sense so as to include in it danger, disease, waste and all that constitutes the basis or cause of suffering. In the terminology of one of the earlier thinkers of Buddha's time *sukha* (pleasure) and *dukkha* (pain) were conceived as two distinct principles, one of attraction, integration or concord and the other of repulsion, disintegration or discord. Considered in this light *sukha* was taken to be the principle of harmony and *dukkha*, that of discord. In the medical texts *roga* or disease which is just an instance of *dukkha* is defined as that condition of the self, the physical self, when the different organs do not function together in harmony and which are attended with a sense of uneasiness. And *aroga* or health, the opposite of disease is defined as that condition of the self when all the organs function together in harmony and are attended with a sense of ease. Thus the problem of *dukkha* is essentially rooted in the feeling of discord or disparity. Birth, decay, or death is not in itself *dukkha* or suffering. These are only a few contingencies in human experience which upset the expectations of men. From the point of view of mind, *dukkha* is just a *vedanā* or feeling which is felt by the mind either in respect of the body or in respect of itself and as a feeling it is conditioned by certain circumstances. In the absence of these circumstances, there is no possibility of its occurrence. Whether a person is afflicted by *dukkha* or not depends on the view he takes of things. If the course of common reality, be that being once in life, one can not escape either decay or death and if the process of decay sets in or death actually takes place, there is no reason why that person should be subject to *dukkha* by trying to undo what cannot be undone. Thus *dukkha* is based upon mis-construction of the *dhammas* or law of things, or the way of happening in life. If the order of things cannot be changed, two courses are open to individuals to escape from *dukkha* (1) to view and accept the order as it is and (2) to enquire if there is any state of *nirvāṇa* or consciousness, on attaining to which an individual is no longer affected by the vicissitudes of life.

The Buddhist answer to this enquiry is that there is such a state of consciousness. In this state consciousness becomes unrelated with

anything which is mundane or mental. To reach this state is to be out of touch with the object of every description. *Jhāna* or *samādhi* is the tried mode of reaching that state of consciousness in this present conscious experience.

Jhāna or *samādhi* is the main point in the Noble Eightfold Path, the remaining seven points being directly or indirectly connected with the last point. The right view and the right resolve representing as they do the first two points are nothing but rightly focussing the attention and rightly directing the course of the will. The right speech, the right action and the right livelihood taken together are the three points that are concerned with the means of purifying one's conduct thereby removing obstacles in the path to *samādhi*. The right effort signifies the means of consciously determining the character of the motive in practising *jhāna* or *samādhi*. The right mindfulness represents the tried means of inducing the *jhāna* mood and cultivating mental awareness of all experiences that occur in the course of meditation. A great stress is laid in Buddhism on the perfection of the method of attaining to that free and pure state of consciousness.

It will be noted that *dukkha* is nowhere postulated as a permanent feature of reality. It is admitted and entertained only as a possible contingency in life as it is generally lived. *Nirodha* representing as it does the free and pure state of consciousness is posited as the ultimate nature of reality. The procedure of thought which has been followed does not admit of the consideration of the question whether Buddhism is pessimism or optimism. Among all the Buddhist sects or schools the *kukkukikas* are said to have taken up a position leading to a pessimistic construction of existence (*jabbā sammāsa kakkhā*).¹ But this was not universally accepted by the Buddhists.

¹ *Points of Consciousness*, Prefatory note, p. xiii.

CHAPTER V

ARIYA ATTHANGIKA MAGGA

(The Noble Eightfold Path)

We have seen that in the architectonic of Buddhist thought as represented by the noble truths, the fourth stem is the Path leading to the cessation of suffering. This path is called the Noble Eightfold Path — the *Āriya Atthangika Magga*. This is otherwise called *Majjhima patipadā* or the Middle Path. The Asokan expression *majham patipādeyamā ti* (S R E) that we will fulfil the mean enables us to understand that the term *majjhima patipadā* rendered

'Middle Path', is rather a misleading coinage. All that king Asoka wanted his officials to do was to fulfil the *majjha* or mean — to realise the ideal of a *via media*. In the expression *Majjhima-patipadā*, on the other hand, *majjhima* or middle stands as an adjective qualifying *patipadā* or path. To explain it in the light of Asoka's phrase the Pāli expression must be taken to mean that it is a definite course of thought or of conduct by which the ideal of *Majjha* may be realised. Some such thought developed also in the political thought of Ancient India. According to the earlier opinion the kings were to carry on their administration on a strict principle, being relentless in method (*śūlīkṛmā*). According to the later and more rational opinion, the kings were to follow a principle of pohty which is neither too strict nor too lenient (*mūlīkṛmā maharāja*). In other words, the political wisdom according to the later opinion lay in striking the golden mean between the two extremes. It may now be taken for granted that in many of the Pāli passages the term met with is not *majjhima* but *majjha* and that wherever the term *majjha* is introduced it is introduced as a golden mean between two extremes (*duḥ andā*). In all these references one may note that *Paṭicca-samuppāda* is mentioned as a formula of thought by which the desired mean can really be fulfilled. Asoka in his Separate Rock Edict (Dhauli) says "Well propounded is the principle thus — If any person suffers from arrest or restraint which

eventually ends in imprisonment¹ many other persons become thereby deeply aggrieved. There you must aim at this, namely that you will fulfil the mean. You are not to proceed under these (immoral) dispositions: envy, distemper, cruelty, impatience, want of application, laziness and lethargy.

The *mapka* aimed at by Asoka is a mean between these two extremes, of which one is represented by richness (*āmaloka*) and the other by lazariness (*ālasya*). By *Maṅgala-paṭipadda mapka* or mean in the *Dhammacakkapavattana-sutta* is sought to be avoided or evaded in so far as the verbal expression goes, the two extremes being (1) the method of attaining salvation by thoughtless indulgence in the affairs of lust (*kāma-kāmaśālisthāna-yoga*), and (2) the method of attaining salvation by the rigorous practice of self-mortification (*attakāyathanā-yoga*). In the doctrine of the Middle Path the futurity of these two methods is sought to be brought out in many ways and in many places. The thoughtless indulgence in the affairs of lust is the way of the common run of men, and the rigorous practice of self-mortification is the traditional way of the extreme type of ascetics.

The first kind of life is illustrated in the *Arivapariyeyasa Sutta*² by the life lived by the Bodhisatta as prince Siddhārtha. The second kind of life is exemplified in the *Mahāsākhaka Sutta*³ by the life lived by the same Bodhisatta as an *Acchaka* or *Iṭṭhaka* after he had renounced the world.

So far as English phraseology goes, golden mean is just the expression which verbally fits in with the Buddhist *Mapka* or *Madhya*. The Golden mean is the middle course between the two extremes — a wise moderation. But the golden mean which the Buddhist has aimed at is reachable by various degrees of approach from two sides. Thence to say the conception and formulation of the golden mean in Buddhism became possible after many centuries

¹ For a full plain, modern relation on Mr. Brierly's interpretation of how abundant it is to maintain that Asoka was a great person to him, the world had become much. But the word *paṭipadda* is hardly meant something which will in be a mean and not that which is it. Cf. *Dakṣiṇa nāmanā* affirm., which culminates in death (*Dakṣiṇa nāmanā* : *nāmanā* : *ka* : p. 1.9).

² *Mapka* : *Nāṭya* I p. 260.

³ *Mapka* : *Nāṭya* I pp. 69 foll.

of evolution of religious life and thought of India without reference to which its historical significance cannot be truly realised. A suggestion has been recently made that it is not so much by avoidance or evasion of the two extremes as by bringing out in evidence the significance of each trodden or proposed path that the Buddhist ideal of the golden mean may be fulfilled. The underlying spirit of this doctrine of the golden mean¹ in Buddhism has been well expressed in the following verse of the *Dhammapadam* verse 141 —

'Na naggarariyā na paṭi na paṇḍa
nandana thandasaṅkha na
rajo ca pallam akkuta-kappadhanam
sodhehi maccam anuttamaṁkham

, Not by nakedness not by plumed hair not by dust not by fasting, not by lying on the bare ground not by rubbing with dust and not by sitting mot-onks² one can purify oneself, if one is not free from desire

This 'golden mean' served as the guiding principle to the whole of the Vinaya discipline according to which, the life of the Buddhist Holy Order was to be moulded. The desired effect sought to be produced was to shift the emphasis from things external to the purity internal.³ The Noble Eightfold Path was propounded as a well-tested method of attaining the internal purity of the self.

The first two factors in this method are *sammāditthi* and *sammā-samkappa* commonly rendered right view and right resolve. *Sammāditthi* as used in this context is otherwise called *sāparisa-dassana* or a view or belief which is not contrary to truth. Here *sammāditthi* conveys the sense of faith or belief rather than that of any metaphysical view or theory. It is precisely in some such sense that the Jains use the term *samundāsaṁsa*. As explained in the *Pāh Dāḍeyvakaṇṇa* ⁴ (p. 288) *sammāditthi* suggests an article of faith which is contrary to that which was inculcated by Ajitake-sakambali and his followers. This article of faith consists in the acceptance of the belief that there is such a thing as gift that there is such a thing as sacrifice, that there is such a thing as oblation to fire that there are such things as results immediate and remote of deeds, well-done and ill-done, this world the other world mother

¹ *Magadhan Niddā* Vol. I p. 39. *imāṁ aṭṭhaṁ aṇaṇaṁ*

² *Magadhan Niddā* Vol. I pp. 285-286

father adventitious birth, and such well gifted and well accomplished religious teachers who truly declare the nature of this and the other world after having realised it through their higher perception or intuition¹ and *samādhikkā* suggests an attitude of faith just contrary to this.² There cannot be *samādhikkā* or right faith unless there is a clear pre-perception of the moral intellectual or spiritual situation which is going to arise. In other words *samādhikkā* is that form of faith which is only a stepping-stone to *pañña* or knowledge. It is the faith or conviction acquired by a Buddhist *sotāpanna* or 'stream-attainer' who is sure to reach the goal. Once you lay hold of the first factor which is *samādhikkā* you are sure to arrive at the last factor namely *sammāsammādhi* which is right concentration, the approved means of attaining *anāgāmi* or purity, and *vimutti* or emancipation. *Sammā-samhappa* or right resolve represents just the will-a-pect of the Buddhist faith. It conveys in right direction of the will towards the goal. Some of the earlier Upaniads teach that all that a *mgn samasti*³ desires to attain comes to the fulfilment from the very *samkalpa* or determination of will (*nam āhamam kamayati so aya samkalpādeva samutisthah ita sampannah mahyat*)

The next three factors namely *sammā-vācā* (right speech), *sammā-kammanto* (right work) and *sammā-ājīva* (right livelihood) constitute the well-ried method of the attainment of moral purity (*sīla-anāgāmi*). The moral purity is not to be viewed as an end in itself but only a means to an end and the end in view is no other than cultivation of mental purity (*citta-anāgāmi*) which is attainable by means of the remaining three factors namely *sammā-vāyāma* (right effort) *sammā-sati* (right mindfulness), and *sammā samādhi* (right concentration).⁴ Conduct or external behaviour is only an outward expression of the moral state- (*cetanukā dharmā*)⁵ which constitute man's internal character. Unless that is thoroughly purified by mindfulness meditation, concentration and introspection the attempt will be like preventing the future growth of a tree simply by cutting it down on the surface leaving the roots

¹ *Maṅgala Sutta* Vol I p. 28

² *Ibid* p. 287

³ *Maṅgala* Vol I p. 14b

⁴ *Visuddhimagga* Vol I p. 7 *Paṭisambhāsā* I p. 44

CHAPTER VI

JHĀNA

(*Meditation*)

"In the words *jhāna* contemplation, and *samādhi* rapt concentration says Mrs. Rhys Davids¹ are contained the expression of that self-training in selective intensive work of mind in which the Indian sought by changing the usual conditions and procedure in cognition to induce consciousness of a higher or different power. *Jhāna* or ecstatic musing was a very long-standing practice similar to the Yoga of the Hindus and the four *jhānas* consist in the process of systematic elimination of factors in consciousness.

Buddhists, evidently following the authority of the *Dhammasaṅgasi* speaks of five *jhānas* a somewhat later classification which had developed out of the four *jhānas* described and differentiated in the Sutta portion of the Pāli canon. The four or five *jhānas* constitute a category by themselves and in many of the Suttas they are relegated to the *vipākīya* sphere of consciousness. In the *Abhidhammatika-Saṅgaha* the five *jhānas* are mentioned as equally holding good in the case of the *lūlūḍha* state of consciousness. It is not however clearly stated anywhere in this authoritative Buddhist Manual why they should not also hold good in the case of the *kāmāvacara* or the *arūpāvacara* sphere. The discrimination made in favour of two out of the four *avācāras* would seem to have been an arbitrary procedure of thought. The four or five *jhānas* considered apart from the four *avācāras* signify nothing else than four or five stages in a process of *jhāna* from its inception to its termination in the attainment of a state of trance (*samāpatti*). Altogether five factors are involved in each process of *jhāna* at its inception, namely *vitakka* *vicāra* *pīti* *sukha* and *ekaggatā*. The first factor *vitakka* is rendered initial application as it directs its concomitant properties towards the object. *Vicāra* is rendered sustained application

¹ *Buddhist Psychology*, and Ld pp 94—95

because it 'permits the continued exercise of the thought on the object' *Piñ* is that factor in consciousness which creates an interest in the same object. *Sukha* the fourth factor is nothing but pleasurable, careful and happy feeling which results from the attainment of the condition sought for and *ekaggatā* is the element of individualisation which develops from time to time into *samādhi*. Thus *ekaggatā* remains a common factor throughout the *jhāna* process. It is indeed the most essential condition of the entire process of *jhāna*. The so-called four or five *jhānas* signify no more than the four or five successive stages of the *jhāna* thought.

In the first stage of meditation five elements viz *vitakka*¹ *vicāra* *piñ*², *sukha* and *ekaggatā* are present. In the second stage the first two are eliminated. In the third the first three are eliminated leaving *sukha* and *ekaggatā*. In the fourth *sukha* is replaced by *sphikkha* and there remain two elements viz *sphikkha* and *ekaggatā*. There is not much difference between these two sets of meditation. In the second stage of the first set of meditations *vitakka* and *vicāra* disappear simultaneously but in the second set of meditations they disappear one after another thus giving opportunity for another stage. The third, fourth and fifth stages of the second set of meditations correspond to the second, third and fourth stages of the first set.

As regards right concentration (*sammā samādhi*) Buddhaghosa describes it as concentration on good thought. It is so called because in *samādhi* all thoughts are simultaneously and rightly centred on a particular subject. Its characteristic is absence of distraction its immediate cause is firmness and its remote cause is happiness. *Samādhi* has been variously divided according to its predominant characteristics. Regarding the purity and impurity of *samādhi* Buddhaghosa points out that the condition which leads to its excellence causes its purity while that which causes deterioration

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¹ *Vitakka* is the directing of concomitant property toward an object and *vicāra* is the continuing of consciousness the mind in that object and is *ekaggatā* the mental property by which the object of consciousness is necessarily regarded as an individual compound, a substance, points in an space or time or in both and is formed an individuality of an object. (See 'Three *Samyutta Sutta* Commentaries on *Viññāna Sutta*' pp. 27-141)

² *Piñ* is an interest in an object.

brings about its impurity. Buddhaghosa says that there are two ways of practising *samādhi* viz. *lokiya* and *lokuttara*. The practice of *lokuttara samādhi* is but the culture of wisdom while the practice of *lokiya samādhi* consists in purifying one's own conduct establishing oneself in the purified conduct destroying the ten obstacles adopting the practice of one of the forty *Sammaṭṭhānas* avoiding living in a manner unsuitable to the practice of meditation destroying the minor impediments and applying oneself to the perfect practice of meditation. It really means concentrative meditation. It is of an intensive attention i.e. of concentration establishing of consciousness exclusively and voluntarily on any single object.¹

It would seem that Buddhaghosa takes *samādhi* almost in the same sense as *jhāna* in contradistinction of the usual sense in which the term *samādhi* is employed and understood in Indian literature. We have suggested above that *samādhi* or *samāpatti* marks the close of a period in the continued process of *jhāna*. The states of *samādhi* or trance are to be conceived as so many halting stations on the road. Attaincy of these states there is a new step, so to speak, of the thought process in *jhāna*. The state is reached by two stages namely *upāna* or access and *appāna* or consummation. A new period begins when another *ārambana* or object engages the attention and mind is concentrated thereon. After having gone through five stages there occurs another state of trance and so on. The Pāli texts usually speak of nine *samāpattis* or states of *samādhi* the first eight of which are said to have been reached or experienced by the Indian teachers already before the advent of the Buddha while the ninth state called *sambodhi-samāpatti* was reached for the first time by the Buddha himself.² The period extending from the eighth to the ninth is broadly subdivided into eight stages or eight degrees of *lokuttara jhāna* as expressly mentioned in the *Abhidhammaśāstra-saṅgaha* the thought-process in *jhāna* proceeds in the same manner as in the earlier stages. According to Buddhist treatment of the subject the *Kamāvacara* represents the non-jhānic or non-reflective sphere of thought. It denotes a level of consciousness when the subject is in touch with external objects as cognized

¹ *Majjhima* III pp. 71-78.

Atthasālinī Vol. I p. 206.

through the senses, the objects themselves being regarded as things belonging to an external order governed by its own *dhamma* (law of happening.) In other words, the nine *samāpatti*s are attainable in three higher spheres of thought and three higher levels of consciousness, namely, the *rūpāvacara*, the *arūpā vacara* and the *lokuttara*, the first four in the *rūpāvacara*, the next four in the *arūpā vacara* and the last in the *lokuttara*. These spheres of thought and levels of consciousness also constitute so many successive planes of direct experience. Thus the intensification of the degree of concentration of mind is determined by the nature of the *dhamma* or object. The further the mind travels away from the objects of sense, the deeper is the concentration. The *jhāna* thus considered is to be viewed as a passage of thought from object to object until a complete isolation from all objects, bodily or mental, is accomplished. The idea of isolation is expressed by such terms as *suksa* (subtlety) or *saṁti* (quiet). It is also a process of self-purification through a gradual elimination of all disturbing and distressing factors in consciousness. The nature of the ninth *samāpatti* called *sāmaśamāpattisaṁvāsa* in which the feeling of *saṁti* or the realisation of *nibbāna* is possible, is hinted at in the *Ullāsaṇḍalla Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nidāna* (Vol. I). In this *Sutta* we are told that the state of trance is reached by the cessation first of *vācāsaṁkhāra* (vocal functions), next of *kāyasaṁkhāra* (vital functions) and lastly of *manasaṁkhāra* (mental functions). And inversely when the normal state of the individual is re-attained, then begins first the mental function, next the vital function and lastly the vocal function. We are further told that when consciousness enters into this state of trance, the individual becomes outwardly as good as dead, *arūpa* or warmth remaining, as the only palpable indication that the person is alive. Certain visions dawn on consciousness as it passes from state to state, from level to level and from plane to plane. The true vision is that which arouses the prospect of the goal. Certain *iddhis* or supernatural faculties also develop in the same process, but one is to beware of them so that they may not stand in the way. Buddhaghosa in his *Visuddhimagga* (pp. 16^a—17^a) speaks of five *phassa*. With regard to *phassa*, two kinds of *asīl* or mystery are obtained: (1) the power of reflecting on the *phassa* thought (*asāvajjānaṁ*) (2) the power of attainment (*samāvajjāna-*

asā) (3) the power of resolution (*saddhāṇā,asā*) (4) the power of exertion (*saddhāṇā,asā*) and (5) the power of concentration (*phassa ākikkhāna asā*). A bhikkhu who has voided the five pleasures of the senses, is said to have passed the range of vision of the evil one who diverted of pleasures and wrong state of mind abides in the first ecstasy, the second ecstasy, the fourth ecstasy, the plane of infinity of consciousness, the plane of naught, the plane of neither perceived nor non-perception and the plane where feeling and perception cease.¹ In the *Jhāna-samvuttā* of the *Samvuttā Sutta*;² the Buddha points out that there are four classes of people who practice *jhāna* (1) one who practices meditation is skilled in concentration but is not skilled in the attainment thereof (2) one who practices meditation is skilled in the attainment of concentration itself (3) one who practices meditation is neither skilled in concentration nor skilled in the attainment thereof and (4) one who practices meditation is skilled both in concentration and the fruits thereof. Of the four the last one is the best and most pre-eminent.

Here we have to consider also the subject of *sampathāna* which constitutes a ground of *jhāna*. *Sammavutti* means right recollection. It also means wakefulness of mind alertness & self-consciousness. It is mindfulness with regard to body,³ sensation, mind and phenomenon (*dhammā*). The *Sampathāna Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* contains the Buddha's advice to the monks to practice mindfulness. It is by the fourfold mastering of mindfulness that one can pass beyond sorrow and lamentation and ills of body and mind and obtain the right path.⁴

¹ Cf. Vi. 1p. 307c; *Mahābhagv. Aṅgutt. I* pp. 151-152.

² *Samvuttā S. Jhāna* III p. 262-271.

³ *Aṅgutt. S. Sutta* *Wipphāsa Aṅgutt. III* pp. 25-26.

⁴ *Wipphāsa Sutta* I pp. 51-61. Cf. also *Udāṇa Sutta* *Udāṇa Sutta* III pp. 25-26. *Udāṇa Sutta* *Udāṇa Sutta* III pp. 25-26.

CHAPTER VII

PUGGALA

(Individuality and Personality)

Puggala, *attā*, *salā* and *jīva* are the four terms which occur in the Buddhist texts in connection with all discussions relating to individual individuality personality self and soul.¹ As a biological term, *puggala* is now here used to deny the existence of an individual being or a living person. When it is said e.g. in the *Dhammapaṭṭa* that the self is the lord of the self (*attā hi attano nātho*)² or in the *Kakapaṇṇāsana Suttaṇṭa* 'Be yourself your own lamp and your own refuge' (*atta-dīpa uharatha attā-saraṇa*)³ by the word *atta* or self is meant the living individual to whom the advice is given. Here the particulars *aravāḍa* or individuals are beings that exist in fact grow in time and ultimately die. Certain philosophical enquiries arise in connection with these individuals the living souls (to use in English phraseology). The question arises how are the individuals known to us? How can they be represented in knowledge? And how far can the ultimate reality be realized in thought or experience?

These points are popularly discussed in the *Uddesapāṭika* in the very opening discussion. We are told that the individuals are signified by some names arbitrarily fixed *Abhisena* *Sārisena* or *Viraṇṇa*. The personal name is only a conventional device to denote an individual and to distinguish him from other individuals. It has no connotation beyond this symbolism. The name in itself is insufficient as a means of forming a complete idea of the individual concerned when we proceed to represent the individual in knowledge we only lay hold of certain percepts or concepts denoting the various aspects or factors. But the individual concerned is not

Abhidharma I p. 26

ibid. 100

ibid. II p. 100

involved in the representation itself. The feeling, however, is that the percepts or concepts with which the representation is concerned, cannot be formed without some sort of reference to an individual and the reference is a whole reference, not mechanically divisible into parts. There never arises a position in thought where the equation of the whole with the sum total of parts is justified, nor can at the same time the notion of the whole be possible apart from the parts.*

The point at issue is illustrated by the simile of a chariot and its parts. Chariot is a name or designation in common use by which a whole thing in its organic unity and working order is meant. But when one tries to lay hold on it, one lays one's finger only on parts. Even by mechanically summing up the parts, the idea of the whole which is sought to be conveyed cannot be produced. The ideas of the parts arise with reference to an object which is not actually involved in them. The object of reference is not a permanent thing while the concepts that are formed in thought with reference to it remain as abstract materials of thought (*arjunaśaśādhāraṇa*).¹ As to a living human being who too is not a permanent object in nature, or in experience, the concepts or general ideas that may be formed in thought with reference to him are the five aggregates (*skandāḥ*) and the rest. The individuals come and go but the concepts as concepts remain as permanent materials of thought and as the possible marks of representation in thought or means of description in words. These are *arjunaśaśādhāraṇa* or concepts as abstract materials of thought.

This elucidation of the Buddhist view of *Pragola* in the *Viṇaya* is but an elaboration of the teaching of a *gāthā* recorded in the *Saṃvatta Vākyaḥ to Bhikkhū* Vajirī.² The discussion in the *Mahāda* presupposes an earlier controversy on this subject (*Pragalaśāstha*) in the *Kāśyapaśāstha*, a book of controversy, which tradition entertains as a compilation of Asokan age. The controversy starts on the question of validity of a certain proposition (*śāstha*) which is to be regarded as a correct verbal representation of the view point or doctrine (*śāstha*) of a certain Buddhist school of thinkers called

¹ *Pragalaśāstha* Comm. I 14, pp. 171 foll.

² *Vākyaḥ to Saṃvattaśāstha*, etc. Vol. I (Bhikkhū Vajirī).

Puggala-sūtra in Buddhaghosa's commentary. As Dr Barua points out there is a good deal of misrepresentation of the opponent's view point the main intention of the orthodox defender of the good faith being only to establish a verbal interpretation of a verbal proposition with a view to taking a dialectical advantage over it.¹ There is an attempt throughout to show that the Puggalavādin's position is not different from that of outsiders who are avowedly the upholders of the doctrine of soul as a permanent entity. But reading between the lines it is easy to make out clearly that wherever the suggestion is made that the import of the point under discussion is identical with the view point of the outsiders it is at once repudiated. The controversy is important as bringing out the exact Buddhist position with regard to the problem of Puggala or Individuality. The position upheld on the whole by the unknown Buddhist opponent may be reduced to this, that to talk about the five aggregates as *pañcagāṇe paññāpita* is to return no answer to the problem of individuality. If five aggregates be real as concepts or means of representation and they convey no meaning without reference to individuals in existence. Without such a reference the aggregates, posited as real, are mere abstractions.

The problem of individuality is bound up with the problem of the ego percipient or internal knower (*jedagā*). The problem of the ego has been discussed in the *Vibhāṅga*. The position of those who uphold the doctrine of the ego is stated thus that there is an internal knower in every living cell or individual who is the real seer of all things seen the hearer of all things heard and so on (*jedagā upalabbhāti*).² The organs of sense stand as so many avenues through which the ego gathers experience of the external world. According to the Buddhist view as set forth in the *Vibhāṅga* the ego thus conceived does not satisfactorily account for the mental phenomena. If the tongue, the organ of taste, had not its local independence the sweetness or bitterness of a thing could also have been tasted and discriminated even when the thing swallowed passes beyond the range of the tongue. The same holds true also in the case of other organs of sense. A scientific explanation of all

¹ *Introduction to a History of Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 24.

² *Vibhāṅga* (Trenckner) p. 54.

mental phenomena does not lie in a single cause such as the ego but in a conjuncture of causal circumstances (*pacca-samagga*). It is true no doubt that whenever any mental operation takes place, it takes place as a unit with regard to time depending on the same subjective basis and stimulated by the same object (*eka-vaññā-kārammaṇa*).¹ The Buddhist formula is there must be the eye, the organ of sight, then must be a visible matter (*rūpa*) present within the range of vision (*āpāthagata*) and there must be auditory cognition, the combination of the three making the sense-impact (*phassa*) possible this impact is a condition precedent of sensation. In searching for the ego which is believed to be the *base* or substratum of individuality, we tumble only upon certain sensations or perceptions or cognitions or volitions or predispositions but never the substratum itself. The usual description of ego is that it is permanent, invariable, eternal firmly established like a wooden pillar of a city-gate and the same for ever (*Attho dhamo sassato eva-kālika-vattho, samaso samaso dhamo*).² But one may always appeal in vain to experience to furnish apodeictic certainty for the existence of such an entity as within the living self. The Buddhist psychologist introduces mind as an internal sense or *inner common-sense* (*manasikāra*) but he is far from positing it as an ego but he admits the possibility of a state of consciousness when it has been free from all obsessions of objects. In this state consciousness as such in no way be characterised (*anānāka*).³ What happens to this consciousness after the death of the individual is not at all clear. But the Buddhist freely entertains the popular belief in rebirth. How can the process of rebirth be explained without the reality of the ego or soul is the question. This too has been discussed in the *Mihada*, as also in the *Kāṭhāvatthū*. It goes without saying that the Buddhist thinker repudiates the notion of the passing of the ego from an embodiment to an embodiment. His is not a theory of transmigration of soul. The course of transmigration has been described in the *Erkat-īraṇṇaka Upaniṣad* by the simile of a grass-leech (*īraṇṇaka*) which passes from the end of one blade of grass to that of another. The *Bhāṭa āmāla* has weight to

¹ *Dhammapaḍa commentary*, Vol. I pt. I p. 2.

² *D. A.* I p. 14 *M. V.* I p. 136.

³ *M. V.* I 140.

show that the analogy is untenable (*na yuktam*). With the Buddhist rebirth is to be conceived as *kammassutata* or the continuity of an impulse. The point is illustrated by the instance of a set of lamps each with fitness for ignition and placed in a row and in close touch with each other one of which being lighted the others are lighted. Here there is no passing of any spirit from one lamp to another. The lamp which is first lighted serves only to help in producing the necessary condition for ignition in the remaining lamps.

CHAPTER VIII

PATICCA-SAMUPPĀDA

(*Dependent Origination*)

Paticcasamuppāda is claimed to be the fundamental concept of Buddhism as a system of thought. The term has been variously interpreted both by the Buddhist scholars themselves and modern scholars without sufficiently bringing out its philosophical import and implications. They have sought to explain it either as a doctrine of causation or that of dependent origination or that of becoming by the way of a cause by the usual and oft-recurring formula of twelve *Nidāna*. There are traditional expositions of the twelve *Nidāna* in many of the canonical texts and later commentaries both in Pāli and Sanskrit. There are several inscriptions referring to *Paticcasamuppāda* as the fundamental doctrine of Buddhism. It is difficult to realise the metaphysical significance of this doctrine. It behoves us therefore to see if the discussion of the problem of *Paticcasamuppāda* can be introduced in a new way.

The formula of twelve *Nidāna* must be taken to be a later appendage to an earlier formulation of the doctrine. The formula came in only by way of an illustration of the original formulation which has been clearly set forth in the three Bodhi suttas in the *Uddāna*. Similar formulations are also met with in some of the suttas of the *Majjhima Nikāya*¹. There is at least one sutta² in the *Majjhima Nikāya* in which the original formulation is presented without the illustrative formula of twelve *Nidāna*. The Bodhi suttas in the *Uddāna* clearly indicate three successive stages in the formulation of the doctrine: (1) *anuloma* or order of becoming, (2) *paṭiloma* or order of cessation (*atirodha*), (3) *anuloma paṭiloma* being a synthesis of the order of becoming and the order of cessation. There were certain Buddhist schools, including the *Sarvāstivādins* in whose opinion the *anuloma* order only is valid. It is therefore not sur-

¹ *Majjhima Nikāya* I pp. 262-263.

² *Cāṇḍakulāvatīya sutta*, *Majjhima Nikāya* II p. 32.

This having been that comes to be from the arising of this that arises. This having not been, that does not come to be from the cessation of this that ceases to be. This is illustrated by the oft-recurring formula of twelve *Nidānas*. The Buddhist schools have sought to explain the earlier form so as to make it fit in with the formula of twelve *Nidānas*. But the question remains — What is the correct interpretation of the *Paṭiccasamuppāda* as stated in the above form apart from any reference to the formula of twelve *Nidānas*? Does it imply a mere order of sequence of facts as experienced and noted, or a fully developed doctrine of causation? So far as we can make out, it is rather a natural basis of the doctrine of causation than the doctrine of causation itself. The sequence is nothing but an order in which snapshots of things are taken and noted down, with the result that the facts as registered, come as disconnected data of experience. In introducing a logical inter-connection between these facts, we have recourse to a law of causation. The idea of sequence implies an antecedent (*ārambha*) and a consequent (*phalā*). Explained in the light of causation, the antecedent is not a single cause but a combination of certain circumstances with causal efficiency to account for the occurrence of the consequent. The causal circumstances when analysed and classified and differentiated, yield the conception of a number of *paṭicca* or rational modes of representing the nature of *dharmatā* in thought. As for sequence, it expressing the nature of reality as commonly experienced, it is not something which mind imagines, but something which forces itself on mind. This led some of the Buddhist schools to speak of *Paṭiccasamuppāda* as *asambhutatthata* or uncreated element.¹ The textual authority cited in support of this view is as follows — Whether monks there be an arising of *Tathāgatas* or whether there be no such arising, in each this nature of things just stands, this causal status, this causal orderliness, the relations of this to that. Concerning that the *Tathāgata* is fully enlightened, that he fully understands. Fully enlightened, fully understanding he declares it, teaches it, reveals it, sets it forth, manifests, explains, makes it plain, saying, 'Behold! conditioned by this, that comes to be'.²

¹ *Kathāvatthū*, Vol. II, p. 310.

² *The Book of the Hundred Sayings*, Vol. II, p. 11.

The *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha* rightly points out that the *Paṭicca-samuppāda* mode (*mayā*) differs from the *Paṭihāna* mode in this respect that it is just concerned with sequence in the procession of events or phenomena as observed (*tabbhāssa tabbhāssa*) while the *Paṭihāna* mode is concerned with the differentiation of the various *paścāyas* or causal factors involved in the causal relation. The difference in view may perhaps be better expressed if we say that the *Paṭicca-samuppāda* mode is concerned with a dynamic view of the *Paṭihāna* mode with a static view of nature or reality. Turning to the oft-recurring formula of twelve *Nidānas* we find that *avijjā* is generally allowed to head the list. The term is generally rendered as ignorance, which does not, however, bring out the philosophical connotation of the term. As regards *avijjā* Buddhaghosa has raised and discussed a very interesting point. Can *avijjā* as conceived in Buddhism be treated as an uncaused root-principle like the *mūlaprakṛti* of the Sāṃkhya philosophy? The Pāli scholar maintains no doubt in agreement with some of the earlier exponents of Buddhism, that *avijjā* is not conceived on the lines of Sāṃkhya *mūlaprakṛti*. With the Buddhists *avijjā* is not uncaused. Buddhaghosa has however to admit that there are some texts in which *avijjā* may appear to be similar to the *mūlaprakṛti* of the Sāṃkhya system. He refers in connection to a text in the *Asaṅguttara Nidāya* in which the Buddha is represented as saying "the beginning of *avijjā* does not appear so that one might say that ignorance did not exist formerly but it has since come into being. However it is apparent that *avijjā* is conditioned. The beginning of *bhava-taṇhā* does not appear so that one might say that *bhava-taṇhā* did not exist formerly but it has since come to being. However it is apparent that *bhava-taṇhā* is conditioned. Thus the Buddha sought to account for the cosmic process of the cycle of births and deaths by mentioning two specific conditions of actions.

The Pāli scholars ought to have considered along with it the other statement which occurs in the *Samvutta Nidāya* (*Anamata samvutta*). In the *Samvutta* text the Buddha is represented as saying "Incalculable (*andha*) is the process of *samsāra*, the beginning of beings running through the course of *samsāra* being cloaked by *avijjā* and tied to *bhava-taṇhā* does not appear"¹.

¹ *Samvutta Nidāya* II p. 186.

All this amounts to saying that endless is the cosmic process, the course of *samsāra* so that its beginning ever remains unknown and unknowable. Thus the entire history of *samsāra* may never be unveiled. But the *dhammatā* of the process is definitely known. The *dhammatā* in question consists in the related character of reality in its process of becoming. If one knows this *dhammatā*, it is immaterial whether one has the historical knowledge of the entire course of *samsāra* or not. At whichever point one takes up its consideration it involves two factors, namely, *avijjā* and *bhava-taṅka* that are sufficient to account for the happy or unhappy states of beings. *Avijjā* is that factor which keeps the nature of *dhammatā* concealed and *bhava-taṅka* is that factor which constitutes an incessant impulse to becoming. All forms of ignorance are expressions of *avijjā* and all kinds of desires are various manifestations of *bhava-taṅka*. It is in this manner that Buddhism meets and answers agnosticism which draws a huge capital out of man's incapability to know the first beginning of the world.

It has been well pointed out by Rhys Davids that the doctrine of *Paccasamapphīda* finds in the *Mahānidāna Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* (Vol. II pp. 55 foll.) the fullest exposition accorded to it throughout the *Piṭakas*. The *Dīghabhāṣakas* or the reciters of long discourse excluded the first two of the 12 *saddhama* or chapter, viz., *avijjā* (ignorance) and *samkhāra* (confections). In the *Paccayakaraṇabhāṣa* of the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* the formula is reiterated and analysed with greater variety of presentation. But in the *Mahānidāna Sutta* the doctrinal contents are more fully worked out. Although the formula as expounded in this *sutta* ends in the usual way — such is the uprising of the whole body of ill — the burden of the dialogue is in no way directly concerned with ill, pain or sorrow. In certain other passages where the *saṁsāra* chain occurs, *dukkha* occupies the foreground (*Dialogues of the Buddha* II, p. 42). *Samkhāra* is Sanskrit *Samskara* which means an aggregation. *Avijjā* (ignorance) is the cause of aggregation. *Taṅka* is also interpreted as thirst, craving. According to the *Cūḍaṅka-saṁkhya Sutta*¹ a bhikkhu wins deliverance by the extirpation of cravings so as to become consummate in perfection in his union with peace and in the higher life and foremost among gods and men. Sensation

¹ *Majjhima Nikāya* I: 151 foll.

is the cause of thirst. *Idaṇā* means sensation or feeling which is pleasurable or painful. *Saḥavatana* is the six organs and objects of sense, viz., *Rūpa*, *Veḍḍā*, *Sakkā*, *Sakkā* and *Viññāna*.

Viññāna is consciousness which, according to the Buddha, runs on and continues without break of identity.¹ All sinful acts may be traced to *avijjā* or ignorance. All wrong states have their origin in ignorance.² It is clear that from contact arises feeling.³

According to the Buddha, the only ideal worth striving after, is the ideal of a perfect life in this present existence in sauntship and this ideal is to be reached by freedom from desire.⁴

In the *Nidāna Samyutta* of the *Samyutta Nikāya*⁵ we find that the Buddha explained to the bhikkhus the chain of causation which begins with ignorance and ends with birth, old age and death leading to grief, lamentation, suffering, sorrow and despair. In the chain of causation we find that six senses originate from name and form. In the *Saḥavatana samyutta* of the *Samyutta Nikāya*⁶ the Blessed One speaks of the six senses. He points out that the eye and the objects of sight, the ear and the sounds, the nose and the sense, the tongue and the savours, the body and the things tangible, the mind and the mind's state are all impermanent, all and void of the self. But there is the way of escape from them. This is the restraint of desire and lust which are in the eye, etc. Where there is no desire there is no ill. He further points out that by seeing the six senses as impermanent, as fetters and as diseases, ignorance is removed and knowledge arises, fetters are abandoned and diseases (sins) are uprooted. The Buddha characterises the eye and the object of sight, the ear and the sounds, etc. as transitory. According to him passion is a disease and one can abide passionless by not imagining, 'I have an eye, etc.' One should not be enamoured of the object cognisable by the eye, etc. If one is, so then one is called unrestrained. If one is not so then one is said to have lack of restraint.⁷ We find that from *phassa* or contact *idāṇā* or feeling

¹ Cf. *Mahāvastu* *Samyutta* *SN* *Vol. I* pp. 250-501.

² Cf. *Opamma Samyutta* *SN* *Vol. II* pp. 262-272.

³ Cf. *Dhāra Samyutta* *SN* *Vol. III* pp. 140-141.

⁴ *Uddāna* chapter I.

⁵ Pt. II pp. 1-33.

⁶ Vol. IV pp. 201-204.

⁷ Cf. *Saḥavatana Samyutta* *SN* *Vol. IV* pp. 1-204.

arises. In the *Udana samyutta* of the *Samyutta Nikaya*¹ we find that there are three *vedanā*s or feelings — Feeling that is pleasant, feeling that is painful, and feeling that is neither pleasant nor painful. The lurking tendency to lust for pleasant feeling to repugnance for painful feeling and to ignorance of feeling that is neither pleasant nor painful must be abandoned. Pleasant feeling should be regarded as an ill, painful feeling as a barb and neutral feeling as impermanent, so all these should be abandoned. This abandonment in a bhikkhu is called rightly seeing.²

In the *Paccasādhaka Vibhanga* various *paccasādas* are enumerated and explained, after which the *sutta* portion naturally closes. According to this *Vibhanga*, *avijjā* or ignorance means ignorance in suffering, in the origin of suffering, in the cessation of suffering and in the path leading to the cessation of suffering.

As regards confections or conformation, we find conformations of merit, demerit, body, mind and speech. There is good thought in the domain of sensual pleasure and in the domain of form, conducive to charity and virtue. The reverse of it is found in *apassādhikāsamādhāra*, confections³ regarding demerit. As regards consciousness it is consciousness as regards sight, hearing, scent, tongue, body and mind. There is name and there is form. The name consists of *vedanā* (feeling), *saddhā* (perception) and *samkhāra* (confection). The form consists of the element of four great beings.

As regards contact, it is contact with regard to eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind. There is sensation due to sight, due to hearing, due to smelling, due to taste, due to bodily action and thought. There is desire for form, sound, scent, taste, touch and *dhammā* or thing. There is attachment for sensual pleasure, false notion, etc. *Bhava* or existence is of two kinds — existence as a state of action and existence as a state of origination. As regards the existence as a state of action, we may speak of the confection of merit and demerit, etc. and as regards the existence as a state of origination, we may speak of the coming into being, form, formlessness, etc. Then as regards birth, it means the existence of beings and the origination of *āśandhā*, or the constituent elements. Then as regards old age and death, there is infirmity of beings and the

¹ IV. 234—235.

Cf. *Udānānupatti Sūta*, IV. 204—205.

ripeness of *indriyas* or senses. Regarding death, it is nothing but disappearance of the human beings and the destruction of *Āhārikas* and life-senses.

Name and Form originate from consciousness and from Name originates ignorance. From sensation, desire, contact, attachment and ignorance originate. Name is nothing but an aggregate of sensation, perception and conception. Six senses originate from name and form, viz., eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind.

CHAPTER IX

KAMMAVĀDA

(Doctrine of Karma)

The Pāli term denoting the doctrine of *Karma* is *Kammaṇṇa* the alternative form of which is *Kammavāda*¹ The doctrine of *Karma* is accepted in all the main systems of Indian philosophy and religion as an article of faith. The Buddha is generally credited with the propounding of this doctrine but there is a clear statement in the *Majjhima Nikāya* to show that the doctrine had not originated with the Buddha. The statement is to the effect that the doctrine was propounded before the advent of the Buddha by an Indian teacher who was a householder.²

According to the popular Hindu belief *Karma* is a sum total of man's action in a previous birth determining his future destiny which is unalterable. Its effect remains until it is exhausted through suffering or enjoyment. This popular notion of *Karma* is exemplified by a birth-story called *Matakkabbatta Jātaka*.

The two extreme views of thought having a bearing upon the doctrine of *Karma* are stated thus in Buddhism. (1) *sabbam paṭhe tatāhetu* all that a being suffers from or experiences is due to the sum total of his deeds in the past. (2) *sabbam akata appaccarā* all that a being experiences in this life is only a matter of chance.

These two extremes are sought to be avoided in Buddhism. Jainism, which too claims to be a rightly formulated doctrine of action (*Karma*) is distinguished from fatalism or determinism on the one hand and the doctrine of chance on the other, takes up a position which is not acceptable to the Buddhists. Partly determined and partly not determined (*anāśrayata*) or partly due to external causes and partly due to oneself is taken to be the declared position of Jainism which has been severely criticised in the *Dhamadoka sūtra*.³

¹ *Maṅgala Sūtra* I p. 463

² *Ibid.* p. 483

³ *Ibid.* Vol. II pp. 214 foll.

On the whole Buddhism shifted the emphasis to the action and state of the mind. Accordingly *Karma* came to be defined as *Cetanā* or volition. A person can not be held morally or legally responsible for any action of his or her if it is not intentional. Thus the Buddhist teachers tried to define *Karma* on a rational and practical basis. This point of view has, however, been shortly criticised by the *Sātrahitanga*¹. In the system of the *Abhidhamma* the Buddhist teachers seek to furnish the psychological data of ethics, men's conduct or external behaviour being regarded as an outward expression of his internal character. The accepted Buddhist idea of the doctrine of *Karma* may be represented by Buddhaghosa's exposition:

Buddhaghosa in his *Itthapālinī*² defines *Karma* as volition expressed in action (*Cetanakam bhikkhave kammam vedamī*). An action is no action until the will is manifested in conduct. *Kamma* means consciousness of good and bad, merit and demerit (*Kammam udma kusalākusala-cetana*)³. *Kamma* is of four kinds: (1) *Ditthadhamma-vedaniya* i.e. *Kamma* which produces result in this life (2) *Upapaccavedaniya* i.e. *Kamma* which produces result in the next life (3) *Apraparyavayavedaniya* i.e., *Kamma* which produces result from time to time⁴, and (4) *Idamkamma* i.e. past *Kamma*. We have another fourfold division of *kamma* — (1) *Garuka* i.e. an act be it good or bad which has a serious result (2) *Lehinā*, i.e. excess of either virtue or vice which produces its respective results (3) *Āsanna* i.e. *Karma* which is thought of at the time of death and (4) *Katālikamma* i.e. an act which has been frequently done by one in his life-time and which in the absence of the three previous *kammās* causes rebirth. We have still another classification of *kamma*: (1) *Janaka* (determining the character of rebirth) (2) *Upatthambhaka*, (sustaining) (3) *Upapātaka* (oppressive) and (4) *Upaghatana* (hurting). These twelve kinds of acts and consequences are manifested in their true aspect in the Buddhist knowledge of the consequences of *Karma*. Those who are endowed with the spiritual

¹ *Jāṇīya Sūtra* II 11 255 E
pp. 50-51

² *Itthapālinī* II p. 514

³ *Itthapālinī* II p. 501

insight come to know some *kammavasi* and *apavasi* ¹ *Kamma* produces consequence, retribution is born of action action is the cause of rebirth in this way the world continues No action passes from the past life to the present nor from the present to the future² Regarding the relationship between *kamma* and *vipāka* Buddhaghosa says that there is no *kamma* in *vipāka* and no *vipāka* in *kamma* Each of them by itself is void at the same time there is no *vipāka* Just as there is no fire in the Sun nor in the lens nor in the dried cow-dung and likewise fire is not outside them but comes into existence on account of their requisites in the same way *vipāka* is not seen within the *kamma* nor outside it A *kamma* is void of its *vipāka* which comes through *kamma* *Vipāka* comes into existence on account of *kamma* ³ In the past the *khandhas* which originated as the consequences of action (volition) ceased In this existence other *khandhas* arise out of the consequences of past deeds There is no condition which has come to this existence from the past in this existence the *khandhas* which are originated on account of the consequences of *kamma* are destroyed In another existence others will be produced from this existence not a single condition will pass on to the next existence ⁴ According to the *Itihavālinī* *Karma* is of three kinds *Āyaka-kamma*, *Vasika-kamma* and *Manasika-kamma* It is *Cetana* and the states associated with it According to Childers all three originate in *cetanā* He further points out that *kamma* under the name of *samkhāra* is one of the links of *Paticcasamuppāda* ⁵ Buddhaghosa divides *kamma* into (1) *Kammavassutthana* (set up by *Karma*) (2) *Kammavassutthana* (caused by *Karma*) (3) *Kammavassutthana* (caused by *Karma* and set up by consciousness) (4) *Kammavassutthana* (caused by *Karma* and set up by waste-heat) (5) *Kammavassutthana* (caused by *Karma* and set up by temperature) *Kamma* is ultimately reduced to the psychological factor of volition Volition is the unique determination of will Will exercise has its power over its co-existent mental properties and

¹ *Visuddhimagga* II p. 60.

² *Visuddhimagga* II p. 603.

³ *Visuddhimagga* II p. 603.

⁴ *Visuddhimagga* II p. 603.

⁵ p. 176.

physical qualities. In fact all our activities in deed, word or thought are due to its influence. The doctrine of *Karma* or the efficacy of good or bad works is inseparably bound up with that of renewed existence. The world exists through *karma* and people live through *karma* (*karmamāna vaitati loka, karmamāna vaitati paṇḍ*)

CHAPTER X

DHAMMA

There is no other word or term in Buddhism which is of so frequent occurrence as *dhamma* or its Sanskrit equivalent *dharma*. This term, precisely as in the Vedic texts is used in both singular and plural forms. *Dhammatā* or *dharma* is coined by the Buddhists as a special term to signify the essential nature of things, the normal condition, the usual course.¹ In actual usage, however, the distinction in meaning between *dharma* and *dhammatā* is not strictly maintained. Mrs. Rhys Davids rightly points out that the word *dharma* has in the history of Buddhist thought undergone much elaboration, more so than in Brahmanism. Whether in its singular or plural form it occurs only ten times in the Three Vedas, it is given no special consideration, historical or other, in a standard work like Oldenberg's *Religion des Indes*.²

Childers suggests that the word in masculine or neuter form, conveys such meaning in English as nature, condition, quality, property, characteristic, function, practice, duty, object, thing, idea, phenomenon, doctrine, law, virtue, piety, justice, the law or truth of Buddha, the Buddhist scriptures, and religion. Similar is indeed the list of meanings suggested by Monier Williams in his Sanskrit-English Dictionary. The Pāli-English Dictionary compiled by Rhys Davids and Stede, gives a more methodical treatment of the word, classifying the various meanings in which it is employed in Buddhism. But even here the treatment fails of its purpose, inasmuch as it does not set forth the reason why and how the word came to comprehend such a wide range of meaning without any fear of contradiction or inconsistency on the part of those who used it. The *Dhammapadam-commentary* suggests that the word *dhamma* has been used in Pāli in one or other or all of these four meanings: (i)

¹ *Dharma Vārtika*, Vol. II, pp. 14, 15. *Dhammatā* and *dhammatā* are the same as *dharma* and *dharma*.

² *Buddhism*, revised edn., p. 62.

hr̥dāvenābhyaṃpāto yo dharmas tam nibodhata

Comprehend that (alone) to be *dharmas* which is cultivated by the learned the elect the persons who are always free from hatred and passion and which is (at the same time) readily responded to by the heart

According to the consensus of opinion the Brahmanya definition of *dharmas* is

Vandakāḥ pratipadye ritāḥ dharmāḥ

† *śikṣakāḥ, ayāsadhvo dharmāḥ pumsām guṇo mataḥ*

Prativedhakatvasādhyāḥ sa guṇo dharmāḥ ucyate

'*Dharma* is an end to be attained in conformity with injunctions in the Vedas

Dharma is to be considered a distinctive quality of men to be achieved by means of action (work, conduct) as enjoined (in the Vedas)

Referring to A-ohan use of the word Mrs Rhys Davids opines

The word *dharmas* is not morality as it is unfortunately rendered in the *editio princeps*, nor is it 'law' or 'good forms'. Senart's 'religion' is better but too ambiguous. F. W. Thomas' definition based on revelation and custom and a sphere of conduct leading to heaven is a better guide. But why the weighty the lofty term for that which ought to be done or not done namely 'conscience' is never used by translators is strange. Or if not conscience then at least, duty. Externally considered, *dharmas* is, for India, law for Buddhism worded doctrine. As belonging to man's inner world conscience or duty is more fit. It is the urge of this sense that makes a man truly 'moral'. Because of that urge he (A-oha) wards his fellowman in his person and in his interests'.¹

In Varuna the Vedic sages arrived at the conception of an ordered universe where everything happens according to Law and nothing by the caprice of an arbitrary will. And in *rita* they reached the conception of rhythmical evolution or harmonious manifestation of the cosmos. Both of these conceptions constituted the historical or philosophical background of the later ideas of *satva* and *dharmas*. In the *Taittiriya Upaniṣad*, I. 1 *rita* and *satva* are introduced as two aspects of one and the same idea or reality — *pratyakṣa-Brahman*. *Pratyakṣam Brahmanam sadisyamam ritam sadityām. satvam sadisyamam*

¹ *Buddhism* revised edn. p. 228

In another passage of the same *Upaniṣad* I 9 *ṛta* and *satya* are mentioned along with *śāpe dāna* and the rest as different items of one and the same system of conduct or duty.

*Rtam ca sūdhivāpṛamāṇaṁ ca Satyam ca sūdhivāpṛamāṇaṁ ca
Tapas ca sūdhivāpṛamāṇaṁ ca*

In a valedictory address in the same *Upaniṣad* I 11 we read

*Satyam vada Dharmam cara Sūdhivāyān mā pramadaḥ Satyān
na pramaditavyam Dharmān na pramaditavyam Kusalaṁ na prama-
ditavyam*

Speak the truth Practise *dharma* Do not neglect the study of the *Veda*. A right-minded man must not deviate from truth from *dharma* and from good.

Thus in the third passage where the word *ṛta* does not occur the word *dharma* is substituted for it *dharma* takes the place of *ṛta*. What is the relation either between *ṛta* and *satya* or between *satya* and *dharma*?

We might suggest that *satya* is that which is in conformity with *ṛta*¹ and *ṛta* is that which is in conformity with *satya* and the same as to the relation between *satya* and *dharma*. Or we might say that *ṛta* assumes the name of *satya* when its nature is stated in terms of words, and that of *dharma* when its nature is manifested in the form of practice, duty or conduct. From one point of view, the whole programme of duty arises out of the primary idea of *ṛta* and from another point of view the whole programme of duty is comprehended by *dharma*. For the use of *dharma* in the sense of genus and species whole and part, in the same breath we may cite here the *Pañ gīthā*²

Yas cāśau dhammā tamarāṇa yathā tava

Saucaṁ dharmasā dhaṁ cāgo dīnasaṁ va atirataḥ

He who is armed with these four *dharma* (principles) truth piety forbearance and self-sacrifice overcomes the foe

The relation between *satya* and *dharma*³ as two aspects of one

¹ *ṛta* which is an antithesis to *satya* is that which is not in conformity with *ṛta*

² *Pañcārāṇa Jāṇaka* (Farnell No. 5.) Vol. I p. 26

³ For the juxtaposition of the two words *satya* and *dharma* or *dharma* and *satya* Cf. *Chāṇḍogya Upaniṣad* VII 2.1 *dharmaṁ cādharmaṁ ca satyam cāśramam ca śāntiṁ cāśāntiṁ ca brahṁyaṇam cābrahṁyaṇam ca*

and the same idea or reality is emphatically brought out in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, I 4 14

*Satyam vaś tat I aṁśat satyam andantam dhar dharmaṁ vadati-
ti dharmaṁ vā vadantam satyam vadati, etaddivyavāṇas ubhayaṁ
bhavati*

Dharma is indeed *satya*. Therefore they say that if a man declares *satya* he declares *dharma* and if he declares *dharma* he declares *satya*. Thus both are the same.

In this text *dharma* stands for 'law, principle of justice, sphere of conduct in conformity with established custom, the disregard of, or departure from which is punishable by law'. For here we also read

*So iacchre-vṛṣṭam aśvaśṛṇa-dharmaṁ Taddat kṣatrasya
kṣatram Yad dharmaś tasmād dharmat paśam vidīyato abalīyam
balīyam samūśansate dharmena yathā vāṇam*

He created still further the most excellent Law (Dharma). Law is the *kṣatra* (power) of the *kṣatra*, therefore there is nothing higher than the Law. Thenceforth even a weak man makes a stronger with the help of the Law, as with the help of a king.

The meaning of the all-important dictum *dharmaś kṣatrasya kṣatrah* requires some amount of elaboration. Here *kṣatra* stands for both the earthly ruler and his divine prototype. When they say *dharma* is the *kṣatra* of the *kṣatra* they mean that *dharma* is the guiding principle of royal administration, which is the same as to say the domination by the warrior-power has its justification or fulfilment only in the maintenance of the social order and the administration of justice. The king in his person is not above the law. It is the law that is above the king.

This conception of *dharma* was elaborated in early Buddhism. But with the Buddha the Buddhist *dharma* is no mere law but something more than law: it is the principle of righteousness in conformity with which a reigning king, is to shape his conduct and guide the course of administration.

*Ke paṇa bhāṇe raṭṭho vāṇo te? Dhammo bhikkhū ti Bhagavā
avoca Idha bhikkhave vāṇo cakkhvatthi dhammo dhammarāja dham-
mam vesaṁ siddha dhammam cakkhonto dhammam garuḷaronto
dhammam apācāramāno dhammadhūjo dhammaketo dhammadhi-
pateyyo dhammakam rakkhāvaranaguttam samādhataṁ antojanas-*

mim bhāṭṭyasa amuṇḍasa (² amuṇḍasa) bahuvāsaṁ brah-
managahapahata negamaṇapadesa samanabrahmaṇa mupakk-
hiṇa ¹

Who is Venerable Sir the King of the king' Dharma O Bhik-
khus is the King of the King and the Blessed One. Here O Bhikṣu has
it is depending on *dharma* (the law of truth and righteousness)
honouring, respecting and revering it, doing homage to it, hallowing
it being himself the standard-bearer of *dharma* the living symbol
of *dharma* and acknowledging sovereignty of *dharma* that the king,
overlord the virtuous and rightful monarch provides the right
watch and rightful protection for his own people for the army, for
the nobles for vassals for Brahmans and householders for town
and country-dwellers for the *śālyas* and for beasts and birds.

It is characteristically observed by the translator of the (*Abha-
vuttadhamma*)-utis that the whole passage in the Pāli is a striking
outburst on the superiority of right over might ²

That the above idea of *dharma* recognises the superiority of right
over might is beyond all doubt. But the principle of righteousness
is far more than the mere sense of right or that of duty. The above
idea of *dharma* implies that there should not be any right or duty
which is imposed from outside. An element of fatigue dissatisfaction
or vexation of spirit is apt to be there when one is to function under
such a pressure from without or such an obsession within. The idea
of *dharma* is such that there should be the fulfilment of the whole
duty of a man as man according to law, according to custom
according to the sense of right good and happiness but no feeling
of tedium or dissatisfaction or vexation of spirit. The whole
course of human duty to oneself one's people one's fellow-beings
and one's fellow-creatures is to flow spontaneously from within
out of an inner urge or innate sense without causing vexation or
exasperation of spirit. It is indeed such an idea of *dharma* as Asoka
sought to inculcate in so many of his edicts and inscriptions.

Dharma is something to take one's stand on ³ something to

¹ *Anguttara* III pp 140-50 cf *Digha* III p 61
Dialogues of the Buddha pt III p 6, ln 1

² Cf Asoka's RE IV *dhammavāṇa* *śālyas*

be rejected as unacceptable. In the case of each Indian system the two aspects are taken together to be its proper representation. So one reads in the *Mahāvastava*, p. 267 '*parassa o dhammam anānupājanas i parassa dhammam dūtham patipadam maggaṃ anānupājanto*'. According to this text *dhamma* which is the same as *dūthā* (doctrinal viewpoint) and *patipada* which is the same as *magga* (practical viewpoint) are just two sides of one and the same *dhamma*.

The *dhamma* is 'that which is intuited or directly sensed or perceived. It is that which is conceived in thought represented to oneself, formulated for the satisfaction of the thinker himself. It is also that which is proclaimed publicly stated promulgated in a particular form or fashion or formulated in the interest of those for whom it is intended. That which is intuited or directly sensed or perceived is either of the nature of reality, or of the material world, or of the mental world or of the physical world or of the moral world or of the intellectual world or of the spiritual world. That which is conceived in thought represented to oneself, formulated for the satisfaction of the thinker himself is the form of solution of the problem which engaged the thinker or contemplative. And that which is proclaimed publicly stated, etc. is the nature of criticism of the solution of the problem or problems offered by others as well as of the new direction to all human pursuit. The *dhamma* of the second kind is to be in conformity with that of the first and that of the third is to be in conformity with that of the second and ultimately with that of the first. Thus indeed one may appreciate the interpretation of the Mahāvastava doctrine of Trikāya 'the three modes of cognition, the successive stages of manifestation or the three forms of expression of the nature of *dharma* — the *dharma*.' We read in the *Saṃvattā Nibāṇa* Vol. II p. 25

Uppāda va Tathāgatanam anuppādaṃ va Tathāgatanam itthaṃ va dhatu dhammābhūtā dhammanāmatā idappaccayatā Tam Tathāgato abhisaṃbuddhābhārametī abhisaṃbuddhābhūtā abhisaṃmetī abhisaṃmetī dīpābhāsi dīpābhāsi patibhāsi patibhāsi anarāsi anābhāsi ālambāsi ālambāsi pūjāsi pūjāsi cāha

Mr. Rhys Davids renders this: 'Whether there be an arising of Tathāgatas or whether there be no such arising the nature of things just stands thus causal status, thus causal orderliness the relatedness of this to that. Concerning that the Tathāgata is fully

Whether there be an arising of Tathāgatas or whether there be no such arising the nature of things just stands thus causal status, thus causal orderliness the relatedness of this to that. Concerning that the Tathāgata is fully

enlightened, that he fully understands. Fully enlightened fully understanding he declares it teaches it reveals it sets it forth, manifests explains makes it plain, saying 'Behold.'¹

Tathā va sū dāṭṭu. The element which is in itself in its own inherent right independently of all thought or interpretation. This is what is called *dharmaṇa tathā sūvata* or *paṇanādharmasūvatā* (as in the *Laṅkāvatīra Sūtra*)²

According to Mr. Rhys Davids this involves the conception of a world-cosmos wherein cause and effect grinds its way, a cosmos rather than a theodicy, an infinite mechanism started none knows when, or how or to what end.³

On the same ground some of the early Buddhist schools of thought (the Pabbaseliya and the Mān-Jaka according to Buddhaghosa) declared *paṭicca-samuppāda* to be *asankhata* uncreated by thought, the uncompounded while the exponent of Theravāda objected to the treatment of *paṭicca-samuppāda* as *asankhata*. *Nibbāna* is *asankhata* with the Theravādi as with the rest of the schools. Thus to regard *paṭicca-samuppāda* as *asankhata* is to admit two *asankhata*s which one could not reasonably do. The decision arrived at in the Mahāyāna system is that *Paṭicca-samuppāda* and *Nibbāna* are essentially one and the same reality. But is *paṭicca-samuppāda* dependent origination when taken in the sense of *paṇāsa-dharmasūvatā*? The term *praty-samutpada* is employed evidently in this very sense in the opening verse of Nāgārjuna's *Mādhyamika-karika*.

Dr E. J. Thomas observes: Nāgārjuna begins by discussing the nature of causation as expressed in the theory of dependent origination (*praty-samutpada*) of the causal formula. Dependent origination is said to be characterised by being (1) without creation (2) without origination (3) without cutting off (4) not eternal (5) not one (6) not differentiated (7) without coming, (8) without going. Its interpretation as a series of causes and effects is entirely rejected.⁴

With Dr. Barua: 'Nāgārjuna's *praty-samutpada* is the element

¹ *The Book of the Hundred Sayings*, II, p. 11.

² *Laṅkāvatīra Sūtra* edited by Nyanpa.

³ *Buddhism* by Mrs. Rhys Davids revised ed. p. 57.

⁴ *History of Buddhist Thought* p. 110.

Buddha to the discovery of an old, burned and forgotten city. So we read in the Pāli *Nagara sūta* (*Samyutta Nikāya* II 105—106)

*Sevathapī bhikkhave puriso amāhe pavaso caramāno passaviya
puranam maggam purāṇāparāṃ pubbakāṃ manussikā amvāṇāṃ || so
tam anugaccheyya tam anugacchanto passaviya purāṇam nagaram
purāṇam upadhūnāṃ pubbakāṃ manussikā apphassuthāṃ*

Just as if Brethren, a man firing through the forest through the great wood should see an ancient path, an ancient road traversed by men of former days. And he should go along it, and going along it he should see an ancient city, an ancient prince's domain wherein dwelt men of former days.

Next in the *Dhammapadam* Yamaka-vagga, Verse 3

*Na hi assaṃa verāṃ sammantidha kaddhaṇam
dassena ca sammanti esa dhammo sanantano*

Hatred does not cease by hatred. Enmity ceases by amity. This is the good old rule.

Thirdly, in Asoka's M R E (Saddāpur) *Esa'porāṇā pakatā dighā-
vuse ca esa, āramesa kattaṃve* *

Such is the most ancient nature, that which is of long standing, thus indeed (in conformity with that) this should be done.

*It esa pi antīkassu yathārahaṃ pavatitavse varisā'porāṇā pakatā,
yathārahaṃ yatha nam arokaṃ vudā* (Yerragudi)

The same should also be propounded as far as possible to the resident pupils according to the good old rule, so that this (noble tradition) will remain unimpaired. ¹

And fourthly, in the *Bhagavadgītā* XIV 1 27

*Sarvatarā ca dharmasya vibhagyaśāntatūlasya ca **

The Pāli expression corresponding to Asoka's *porāṇā pakatā* is *purāṇāṇi-pakatā*. The *pakatā* or *pakatā* (Sk. *prakṛti*) is no other than another term for *dharma*. The *Sona-Nanda-Jātaka* (Fausbøll No. 532) which embodies a teaching almost literally similar to that in Asoka's Edicts contains among others the following two gāthas setting forth the ancient or eternal nature of *dharma*.

*Aśāśvaram mahāraja purāṇam purāṇāparāṃ
idhammānāṃ jathareṃ nirāṇam so upapuggatī
| e ca dharmassa balaṃ purāṇassa dhammapatī
| arittha ca sampanna na te gacchanti dugatam*

* The text read and translated by B. M. Barua in *J. H. Q.* Vol. VII, pp. 113-114.

According to the first *gāthā* the *adhamatarī* is one who abandons one's respectful duty to one's elder brothers and others in accordance with the time-honoured tradition of household life.

According to the second *gāthā*, the virtuous man is he who effectually conforms to the ancient tradition — the established custom.

The gloss adds that here *dhamma* is the *param-dhama* the *dharma* which has held good by continued tradition — the precedent.

In dealing with the seven essential conditions of welfare of a nation (or of an order or institution) the Buddha definitely lays down

Yasāññāṇaṃ ca appaṇṇāṇānaṃ na paṭhippessanti, paṇṇāṇānaṃ na sammahāṇissanti yatha paṭikkāṇe paṇṇe dhamme cattarāṇi sūddhi yesa paṭikkāṇaṃ na parikkāṇi ti (*Mahāparinibbāna suttanta Dīgha II*)

so long the members of a nation (so of an order or institution) will not introduce that which is not established according to custom, will not destroy that which is established according to custom and will abide by the good old rule so long they may be expected to prosper and not to decline.

In explaining *paṇṇe caṇṇi-dhamma* in this text Buddhaghosa speaks of a *param paṭikkā* (Book of Precedents) among the Vṛys from which guidance was to be taken in deciding all cases (vide B. C. Law's *Some Kāśyapa Tribes of Ancient India* p. 103 Rhys Davids' *Buddhist India* p. 22).

Thus it may be shown that *paṇṇa* or *saṇṇāna* is that which has held good for a long time — that which has been adhered through many ages — that which has therefore become a normal state of things — a normal course of life. The normal implies a norm (that which ought to be done or not done), as well as a normal state of the body, mind or morale of a person which enables him to respond to the norm and to abide by it.

The normal carries with the idea of universal, that which is or may be normally expected of all under a similar set of circumstances.

Yasāññāṇaṃ paṇṇaṃ manūpeṇa narakāṇaṃ avāṇṇaṃ aññāṇāṇaṃ ca iṃ kāmā sikkā lakkhaṇaṃ *Yan tam iṭṭam bhūtaṃ sandhātāṃ paṭikkādharmānaṃ tam paṇaṃ nupalejjaṭi, n etam theraṃ iṇṇaṭi* ¹

¹ *Dīgha Nikāya Vol. II* p. 154

of study, or a system of conduct, or a system of mind, or a system of thought, or a system of faith and worship. It is not only the system as a whole but each part of it goes by the name of *dharma*. For instance, Buddhism as a system of religious thought is called *dharma* or *saddharma* and each of the thirty-seven main points or terms belonging to that system is also called a *dharma* (*sattatimsa bodhipakkhikā dhamma*).

The *Dhammasaṅgani* which is a Buddhist manual of psychological ethics gives an exposition of *dhammas* classified as moral (*kāraṇa*), immoral (*akāraṇa*) and *avyākata* (indeterminate). These *dhammas* constitute the mental basis of character which finds its expression in conduct or action. Buddhaghosa takes them to mean those mental states which bear their own intrinsic fruit (*sabbhava*).¹ Prof. or Sr. Cherbitsky has discussed at length *pramāṇa* in which sense these *dhammas* are regarded as *anattaśūnyatā*; the intended distinction being between *saśāstra* (the theory of no soul) and *saśāstra* (the theory of non-soul). According to the opening verse of the *Dhammapadam* mind and all things mental are *dhammas*.²

The *Paṭimokkha* which is a Buddhist code of monastic discipline contains a various rules of conduct, each of which is called a *dhamma* (*paṭimokkha dhammā*, *vaṇḍadhammā*, *amāyā dhammā* etc.).

In the *Ālā-Sakudāyā-Sutta* (*Majjhima Nikāya* II, p. 32) the term *dhamma* stands for the sequence of facts as experienced or the law of causation or way of happening, by a way of cause is formulated.

Dhammam ti devaṇṇiṃ — Imasmim sati idam hoti tass nippaḍḍham upapajjat etc.

Just as on the one hand, *dharma* stands for the entire system of sequence or the chain of dependent origination so on the other hand it stands for each single factor or link which is accordingly called a *wholen dhamma* (*pativasanuppanna dhamma*).

Similarly, it may be shown that *dhammas* stands not only for the entire system of faith, thought or doctrine but for every part or argument or point of it.

¹ *Uṇṇāḍa* I, p. 63. *Ti sm tasm dhammānaṃ satatā aṃvāḍḍhānaṃ* etc.

² *Uṇṇāḍa* Vol. V, No. 4, p. 743.

³ *Dhammapadam* I pp. —23, 35—36.

An attempt has recently been made to prove that the term *dharma* is so devised as to comprehend real realised and reality actual, actualised and *actuality*, phenomenon phenomenal and *phenomenality* matter material and *materiality* mind, mental and *mentality*, cause caused and *causality* law legal and *legality* thought, thinking and *thinkability* and the like, in short the entire universe of reality and appearance truth and opinion thought and expression principle and action in and through which all things and all individuals may realise their being feel their existence rise into recognition, move into action or proceed to perfection. That is to say, *dharma* is not only that which was is or shall be in itself in its inherent right or in its nature or characteristic form but that which comes to happen or prevail on account of its inherent force or intrinsic merit or value

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CHAPTER XI

NIBBĀNA

To contemplate the *dhamma* (doctrine) as propounded and promulgated by the Buddha is to contemplate *nibbāna* while to contemplate the *dhamma* as propounded and promulgated by Asoka is to contemplate *naga* (*varga*) rather *apāra naga* (unmeasured heavenly joy)¹ *Nirvāna* is the *non plus ultra* of the *dhamma* expounded by the Buddha, the *summum bonum* (*sabbadhammasam uttamattithena varam*) of Buddhism² the ultimate of all that a Buddha taught or would teach. Thus Buddhism is in essence a proclamation of the truth of *nirvāna* a clear statement of the truth about *nirvāna* a search for *nirvāna* (*nibbāna parivassana*) and a tried path leading to *nirvāna* (*nibbānagāmiyaṃ paṭipada*)³ The *Netti pākāsa* which, as a Pāli work of exegesis and analysis, is allowed by tradition to rank in both antiquity and authority with the very oldest of the Buddhist canonical texts declares to the same effect —

*Saddhakkhito Ekaggaṃvāṇo dhammo sandattakko akaliko cāpavāso
apavāso paccattam vedatabbo mātthiko yad idam madantummadamo
pāpasa-nivāso dāyasaṃyogghāto cattupaccchedo suttāto atidullabho
tanhakkhavo arāgo niruddho nibbānam*⁴

Well expounded by the Master is the doctrine which bears the desired fruit here and now, which has 'Come and See' for its motto, which essentially leads to the goal the truth whereto is to be experienced by the wise, each individually for himself namely the one which consists essentially in subduing the haughty spirit, the perfect control of thirst the upsetting of the very storage of creative energy, the arrest of the course of *samsāra* as regards the fate of an

¹ M. B. E. — all copies.

Asokaśāla apāra naga — *mones* — *hans* p. 143.

² *Asokaśāla apāra* Ratana — *śāla* V. 1. — *dhammasam uttamattithena* — *nibbāna*, *śāla* — *parivassana* — *hans* p. 143.

³ *Netti* p. 34.

individual the rare attainment of the state of the void, the waning out of desire, the dispassionate state, the cessation of all sense of discordance, the nibbāna.

To the very same effect the Buddha is represented in the *Irya-parivatsana-sutta* as saying —

Nibbanam parivatsamāno ajātam anattāram vagabhihamam nibbanam ajhagamam ajaram abyadham amataṃ asokam asankhittam Adhigato kho me ayaṃ dhammo gamhiṃso daddaso duranubodho santo paṇṇo atakkasacaro nipuno pandita-sedeniva ¹

In seeking for salvation I reached in experience the nibbāna which is unborn untravell'd secure from attachment undecaying unaging undying unlamenting and unstained. This condition is indeed reached by me which is deep, difficult to see difficult to understand, tranquil excellent beyond the reach of mere logic, subtle and to be realized only by the wise (each individually for himself).

The *Tiśasaka-kara* of the *Netti* which had served as a literary model for the Pāli lexicon *Abhidhānappajjapikā* catalogues various words or terms, virtually called synonyms, that bring out different aspects of *nirvāṇa* as conceived and described in early Buddhism. The *Netti-commentary* explains these terms as follows: —

Nirvāṇa is called *avakāṭha* (uncompounded, absolute) because it is not accounted for by any known causal factor (*na hivaṃsa paccayena sankhataṃ*), *ananta* (endless, infinite) because it does not come to an end, or knows no extermination (*nattāṃ cassa anto tinaso*), *andhava* (stainless) because the influence of sin have no hold on it (*disāḍḍham anavassunnato*), *sacca* (true, real) because it is not of a nature to be other than what it is (*a uparikkambhū attā*), *para* (the other shore), because it makes for the further shore of the ocean of existence through *samsāra* (*samsārasu parattarāharaṇato*), *nipuna* (subtle) because it is accessible only to a subtle cognition as well as because it is in itself of a subtle nature (*nipunāṇānaṃ a suṭṭha nibbāna-sambhūtiṃ*), *asiddhanta* (very difficult to see) because it cannot be apprehended now and except by the instrument of a gradually matured knowledge (*anuppatimāna-sambhāraṇa dāṭṭham na sakkā*), *ajapara* (unimpaired) because it is not affected by any

¹ *Majjhima Nikāya* I 107

² *Netti* p. 32

process of decay (*uppadajarahi anabhināśita*), *dīna* (immutable) because it is in itself for ever (*cirābhavati*) *apaloka* (not vanishing) because it does not disappear on account of decay and death (*garavarānta apalajjaraṭi*) *andassana* (invisible) because it is not perceptible to the eye common or divine (*manuṣasakkhāna dibbaccakkhāna ca aparistabbhāṭi*) *n.papaṭṭa* (not subject to ramification) because of the absence of the ramifying action of passions (*āya-dipapaṭṭicakkhāna*) *anta* (tranquil) because of the total stoppage of the mischievous actions of sin (*kileśābhāvānāhāraṇam āpārasa-hatūlaya*) *amata* (undying) because it is of an immortal nature and it is not liable to disruption (*amatahetūlaya bhayābhavena*) *paṇita* (excellent) because it is of a supreme kind and it is self-sufficient (*uttamāṭṭhena anappamāṭṭhena ca*) *aya* (rich) because there is no effect on it of baneful consequences of sinful deeds (*avīdham kammaṭṭasaṃpākanāṭṭham abhāva*) *āhena* (secure) because it is secure from the four fetters (*cuttāni yogeṇi anupaddasābhavena*), *saṃbhāṭṭa* (attenuation of desire) because desire is attenuated to nil therein (*tanhā kkhīṇāy ettha*) *acharya* (wonderful) because it is rarely to be seen even by those who are virtuous (*kataṃpāṭṭha pi kaṇṇena eva pavatibbhaṭṭa*) *abbhāva* (marvellous) because it is unprecedented (*abbhāvaṃvadaṭṭa*) *anūṭṭha* (unimpeded) because there is no obstacle in its way (*anantarāyāṭṭi*) *anūṭṭhaḍḍham* (not risky) because it is not of a nature to run any risk (*anantarāyāṭṭhaḍḍhaṭṭa*) *evāṭṭa* (unborn) because it is not subject to birth (*anibbhaṭṭi-cābhāvaṭṭa*) *abhāṭṭa* (not subject to becoming) *upāśāṭṭha* *anupadda* (undisturbed) because it is not troubled by any disturbing factor (*ānāsa anupaddatāṭṭa*) *akata* (unrelated) because it is not manipulated by any known cause (*paṭisaṇṇi peccavāna kadam*) *asoḷa* (unlamenting) because there is no sorrow in it (*anāṭṭha ettha soḷa*), *soḷa* (sorrowless) because there is no cause for sorrow (*soḷaḷa/vegaṇṇa*) *anupasaṇṇa* (uncomplicated) because it is not complicated by any complication (*ānāsa anupasaṇṇatāṭṭa*) *anupasaṇṇadhamma* (not of a nature to suffer from any complication), *gambhīra* (deep) because it is only within the reach of profound intuition (*gambhīraṇa-gocarato*) *duppassa* (difficult of perception) because it is difficult to perceive difficult to obtain without the right path (*sammāpā-pāṭṭam eva paṭṭam pāṭṭam asakkhuncyāṭṭa*) *ottara* (transcendental) because it lies beyond the whole of the mundane world (*sabbalokaṃ*

uttarāṃśa (beyond it), *asuttara* (unsurpassed) because there is nothing beyond it (*ti attāṃśa uttarāṃśa ti*) *asama* (unquelled) because there is nothing equal to it (*samava sadivasa abhinava*) *appamāna* (inextensible) because there is no counterpart of it (*patibhāgabhāva*), *sattha* (sumnum bonum *attamaṭṭhena*) *jettha* (supreme) because it is the best thing for peace (*pāsaṃ satamatta*) *lāna* (habitat) because it is the abode where persons afflicted by worldly sufferings can lie down (*samsaradukkhatthutena lānabbūta*) *lāna* (protection) because it protects from worldly sufferings (*taṇṇa rakkaṇatva*) *araṇa* (hitchless) because there is no hitch in it (*paṇāhāna*) *anagana* (spotless) because of the absence of any spot (*anagābhāva*) *akama* (innocent *vidhūmatva*) *vināsa* (unimpaired) because all impurities due to passion and the rest are got rid of (*ragādīnāmapagameṇa*) *dīpa* (island) because it is not subject to inundation on account of the four kinds of flood of sin (*catthi oḷḷhi anayhotthavānīti*) *sukha* (ease) because of the complete subulence of the unease of *samsāra* (*samsāraṇuparāmasukkatva*) *appamaṇa* (unmeasured upmeasurable) because there is nothing else to measure its worth (*parama-kāradhammābhāva*) *pamāṇa* (quantity *dhava na vaḥ ka ti*) *patittha* (support) because it is the stand to prevent sinking into dangerous waters of *samsāra* (*vaṇḍavānudda amūḍanāthanaṭṭva*) *akūṭana* (having nothing by way of attachment and possession), *āgādānā-candbhāva* (*pariggahābhāva* ca)

The list of synonyms of *nirvāṇa* in the *Abhidhānappadīpikā* which is substantially the same as that in the *Atth* contains such new terms as follows —

mukha (mukhya supreme) *arūpa* (incorporeal) *amūḍa* (amūḍa formless unformed) *asava* (ultimate refuge) *akāṇha* (imperishable) *abhipajjha* (itchless) *amūḍa* (without any stay for desire) *vināsa* (end of the course of *samsāra*) *kaṇḍa* (*kaṇḍatva* a thing in itself uncaused independence) *apamāṇa* (*apamāṇa* abandonment of the things of the world) *vera* (*vera* detachment) *acintapada* (immutable state) *mūḍa* (liberation) *vināsa* (purity) *vināsa* (unmanipulation) *asaṅkhaṭṭha* (element of life absolute) *amūḍa* (holiness) *nibbāṇa* (*nirvāṇa* blessedness)

The multiplication of these so-called synonyms of *nirvāṇa* and the philological explanation of them which is, more or less, fancied and fantastic, are of little help in appreciating the Buddhist conception

of *śūnyas* or in distinguishing the same from the Jaina or the Brahmanical conception. The only sure and scientific way of attacking the problem of *śūnyas* would be to consider it from the different points of view. Our approaches to the subject should not only be logical and mystical,¹ but also historical, eschatological, poetical or popular psychoethical.

Historical Aspect — The wide popularity of *śūnyas* as a distinct term of Indian religious thought is undoubtedly due to the greatest importance attached to it in early Buddhism by the Buddha, his immediate disciples and his later followers. It is somewhat astonishing that the term occurs nowhere in any of the Vedic or Brahmanical texts that may be definitely assigned to pre-Buddhist dates. An exception is worth of course, to be made in favour of Pāṇini's *Aṣṭaśāṣṭī* accounting grammatically or etymologically for the formation of the word *śūnyas* by the aphoristic rule *Śūnyāśate* (b 2 30). Pāṇini's date, if it is at all earlier, cannot be far removed from that of the rise of Buddhism. Secondly, it is yet to be ascertained if this particular aphorism belonged actually to Pāṇini's own organon. Even if it did belong it is still to be seen whether with Pāṇini the word *śūnyas* was any more than a popular expression. In popular usage the word *śūnyas* was employed either in connection with a burning fire or in connection with a burning lamp and in both cases it meant nothing but extinction. *paṇṇāso* is a *nibbānam* (*Dīgha* II, p. 157) like the extinction of a burning fire or lamp *nibbanti dhammā vekkhamāṇā padīpā* (*Sattasānpitā* and *Aṅguttara-kappaṭṭha* *Ratana-sutta* V 24), the wave *paṇṇāso* is just in the same way as this burning lamp extinguishes *nibbāno gāṇi* (*Sattasānpitā* *Dhamma-sutta*, V 2), the fire has been extinguished *nibbāto* standing in contrast to *dhūto* meaning properly kept up *parato aggo nibbāverāso* *ayaso me parato aggo nibbāto* (*Maṅgala* I 457), if this fire before me were to extinguish, if this fire before me were extinguished.

As regards Jaina literature the term *śūnyas* is met with in the texts of the *Ājamas*, — such authoritative texts as the *Āśṭaśāṣṭī*, the *Sūtrakraṅge* the *Uttarārdha-sūtras* and the rest. But the Jaina

¹ It is mainly from the logical and mystical points of view that Dr. B. M. Iyengar has covered all the questions of *śūnyas* in his Bombay lecture "Unusual Aspects of Buddhism".

common parlance but the painful necessity of undergoing the repeated process of birth and death — of passing through the cycles of birth and death running in the course of transmigration of soul¹ or finding somehow the concettion of individual existence through the repeated natural process of birth and death.

It is the consciousness of the contingent character of *samsāra* the world of life and existence and the bitter experience of its unpleasantness or unsatisfactory, equal that is at the back of the religious quest of a permanent ground of existence and experience — a permanent feature or element of reality, some sort of an Absolute. So Buddha is represented as saying: Having been myself subject to the contingency of birth and experienced its unpleasantness, I sought for *Nirvāna* which is without such contingency — which is unsurpassed and secure from all worldly joys and obtained it. Subject to the contingency of decay, the contingency of disease, death sorrow and sin I sought for *Nirvāna* which is without such and such contingency² — which is unsurpassed and secure from all worldly joys and obtained it. The knowledge with the vision arose: Sure is my final emancipation, this is the last birth, there is no longer the possibility of rebirth. Then this thought occurred to me: I have reached this element of things which is deep, difficult to see, difficult to understand, tranquil, excellent, not within the reach of mere logic, subtle and to be experienced only by the wise each for himself. The multitudes find delight in the home, they are attached to the home and rejoice over it. It is difficult indeed for them to apprehend this position (of *samsāra*) namely, the causal determination of all occurrences in fact, — of all becoming — to apprehend also this position (of *Nirvāna*) namely, that it is the subvencence of all predisposition towards the form of creation, the relinquishment of all ideas of belongings, the extinction of desire, the dispassion, the cessation, the ultimate.³

¹ Even the Buddha himself is recorded as saying: (*Magghima* I p. 82)

*Idam āro pana āvāso jaso: vātho mahallālo dīthāgato arā anuppatto
asāto me arā affāto*

² The idea is Brahmanical as well as Jain.

³ The Buddhistic way of expressing it.

⁴ *Magghima* I p. 107. *So āro āham atāro pīdhammo samāno pīdham me
dhammam addāmi ajātam anuttaram jogaṭṭhaṃ me: nibbānam parināmanā*

special or transcendental condition of human soul, in which it remains eternally and absolutely free from passion hatred birth decay disease and the like because of the complete waning out of all causes of *dukkha*.¹

The *Vibhūṭipāṭha* definitely says that after the attainment of *parinirvāṇa* the Buddha is no longer in that condition in which he is able to receive any offering made in his honour, though the offering itself as an act of worship is not fruitless on that account so far as the worshipper is concerned. Thus the Buddhist description of Buddha's *parinirvāṇa* leaves no room for the popular belief in the possibility of resurrection of the bodily form or even the spiritual form of a saint.² Is it, nevertheless, a complete cessation of personality, even if that personality is made up of pure consciousness? According to the *Lokāśāntāra-Sūtra* there is then *lakṣaṇa-nirodha* (cessation of all signs of manifestation) but no *prabandha-nirodha* (cessation of process of *saṃsāra* in its own pure or transcendental mode).³

In all stages of evolution of religious thought in India the description of the ultimate goal of the higher path of religious effort carried with it the dread of extinction of the individual after death. In the opinion of such ancient law-givers as Baudhāyana and Āpastamba the *devas* leading the traveller by an onward journey to the pure realm of infinity beyond the solar region led really, but to the funeral ground *śmaśāna* and those who travel by that path alone, in disregard of *pitṛvāṇa* become ultimately dust and perish (*yojo bhūtiś cā dhīmanate*).⁴

Ru Ṛgveda's statement of the fate of the soul after man's death caused puzzlement to the simple minded Master! Verily I say unto thee the soul is complete in itself within and without. As a mass of intelligence (or consciousness) it emerges out of these (five) elements and loses its form of manifestation with their dis-

¹ *Sāto c' dhammā anāpā jhāna nirodha bhāva s' anāpā' Kathaṇṭakopani' Kāṇḍa dīpa, anandaṇḍa nāṇā' dhammāsaṃgāhā'.*

Note the description of emergence of an effulgent miniature form of the sage Śarabha, a out of burning fire, as he offered himself as an oblation to the *Samāyāna* *brahman*.

² Vide *Lokāśāntāra Sūtra* (Nirupāṇa edition).

³ Barua, *History of pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy*, pp. 47—49.

Disciples and all followers and worshippers find their place. No birth, no death. No sorrow, no lamentation. A ceaseless scene of peaceful worship and religious conversation in the midst of the very best of natural surroundings. A full heart and a serene mind in a world of plenty.

The same process of poetry and myth continued to produce at last the Sanskrit *Saṃvāsa-sūtra* a Mahāyāna work giving a highly romantic or imaginative description of a Buddhist Paradise: the realm of Amitābha, Amṛtaprabhā. The Sukhāvāsi is the infinite world of light, brilliance and effulgence. The Amṛtābha, as it may be easily perceived, is no other than the Buddha in his infinite glory after his demise — the *maṇiparvānātha*.

A similar poetic imagery about *samsāra* hangs in the metaphysical expression *samsārasaṃyama* or *saṃsārasaṃyama* which is met with in Buddhist sūtras & in *śālisthana* and some of the later Jaina works.

Logical aspect — If it be assumed that *samsāra* as commonly understood is something which has the contingency of birth, development and death (*ajāta bhūta mātā*) the inquiry may pertinently arise if there is something else which has no such contingency (*ajāta abhūta amātā*). This inquiry was once pressed by certain inquirers among Buddha's immediate disciples. When the matter was thus pressed Buddha gave a reply, the tenor of which went to convince the inquirers that they simply begged the question in pressing such an inquiry. The argument used was: The very fact that you have been striving after that something else which is without such contingency is sufficient to prove that you have been tacitly all believers in its possibility and were you not tacitly believers in its possibility you would not have cared to strive after it.¹

According to Nāgārjuna, *Samsāra* and *Viśvavāsa* are two relative ideas, and as such there can be difference but no absolute distinction between the two (*samsārasya ca viśvavāsaḥ saṃśīlīkṛtā*). If the significance of one term is dependent on the significance of the other, both stand on the same footing in respect of each other. There cannot be any conception of a relation between the two even in apposition if there be not a common point of reference which is without differentiation or characterization, and from which

¹ U. S. pp. 41-42.

universality) is in itself inadequate to comprehend the whole of reality which is constituted not only of cognition but also of volition and feeling, to comprehend all of which yet another category is required, and it is *Nirvāṇa* (the Ideal, Ideality). It is not an experience that one may identify oneself with it or think that either one is *Nirvāṇa* or one is in *Nirvāṇa*, or one is from *Nirvāṇa*, or *Nirvāṇa* is one's own.¹

Psychical aspect — Here psychical is just another term for mystical. The mystic as distinguished from *saddhānuyutta* (devotee) or *paññānuyutta* (intellectualist), aspires to be a *Keyerakkhū*² or personal witness to to be fact to face with to have a direct perception of, to come in immediate contact with in short to realize *nirvāṇa* by himself and for himself. It is after such realization that he begins to utter the joy of self-expression (*uddham udamethi*), to give an expression to self-mastery (*sāṭṭhā*) and to teach the way of realizing *nirvāṇa* to others (*sāṭṭhāya saṅghakāraṇaṃ parivāseti*). With him *nirvāṇa* is at once a vision, an experience, a feeling and a self-state — the highest, the best, the most real of all that he knows of, thinks of, or speaks of. As an element of experience it is inalienable, because the wise are to experience each in himself by himself and for himself (*paccattāya sikkhāya vedhābham*) it cannot be communicated to others, because its nature as experienced by each individual is indescribable in words. The message or personal testimony must be worthy of trust, the individual bearing it must be in a perfectly sound condition of body, mind, intellect and spirit. The vision of *nirvāṇa* draws upon consciousness; the realization of *nirvāṇa* is possible in that stage of *samādhi* (trance, self-concentration) which is aptly called *saṁhita-cetasanirōdha*. According to Buddha's claim, this is the ninth stage of *samādhi* reached for the first time by him, one step ahead of eight *samāpattis* (attunements, first stages of *samādhi*) mastered by other contemplatives in India already before his advent.³ The *Saṃpattiyaṇa* is the well-tried grammar to be followed by the aspirant in assuredly reaching and mastering all the nine stages of *samādhi*, the ninth being truly

¹ *Majjhima I*, p. 6.

² See for the explanation of these terms, Lamotte, *Faith in Buddhism*, in *B. C. Law's Buddhist Studies*, pp. 329—349.

³ *Devapāṇi*, in *Suttā Saṃyutta*, *Majjhima I*, pp. 103—6.

called *nirvāṇa-kāya* (without any excogitation) and *nirvāṇa-kāya* (without any illusion or hallucination). Without going into details here it may suffice to quote the following short but intelligible description of the psychical mode.

In accordance with the mystical or psychical mode the process of meditation is to proceed from one plane of experience or one level of consciousness to another. The highest state of trance reached by Buddha is called *sāma-samāpatti-nirvāṇa*. This is a state of trance when outwardly the man who reaches it is as good as dead¹ there being nothing but warmth (*usma*) as the sign of life.² In this state a level of consciousness (*citta*) is reached where consciousness is ultimately thrown back on itself completely void (*suñña*) being devoid of the subject-object relation (*grāhya-grāhaka-bhāva-rakṣa*).³ In the same state, a plane of religious experience is reached where there is no longer any longing for this or that object of sense. This is the highest psychical state where consciousness appears to be face to face with reality.⁴

Ethical Aspect — The ethical aspect of *nyāyā* is too well-known to need much elucidation here.⁵ Let it suffice to say that the main ethical term to express the nature of Buddhist *nyāyā* (and a posteriori that of Jain)⁶ is *Piṇḍita* or Purity. From the ethical point of view, to realise *nyāyā* is to attain the highest purity of one's own self, — of one's own nature (*śuddhitas attava*). Thus the

¹ When on the eve of the Great Dharma Buddha remained locked in the *suñña* called *sāma-samāpatti-nirvāṇa*. Ānanda thought he was already dead and, near the end of the Upaniṣad, he said: *Parivartita bhāṣa ānandaṁ āhvaṇāsi* (Upaniṣad, p. 156). See *Upaniṣad*, p. 156. *Parivartita bhāṣa ānandaṁ āhvaṇāsi* (Upaniṣad, p. 156).

The N. Dutta (4-part of *Mahāvīra's Buddhism and its relation to Hinduism*, pp. 1-2, 10-11) has attempted an elaborate description of the *śuddhi* and *śuddhi* stages, which is not however so illuminating, and clear and psychological as that in Shree Jan Anand's *Introductory Essay: Compendium of Buddhist Philosophy*.

² *Upaniṣad* (4-part of *Mahāvīra's Buddhism and its relation to Hinduism*, p. 10, 11). See *Upaniṣad* (4-part of *Mahāvīra's Buddhism and its relation to Hinduism*, p. 10, 11).

³ *Upaniṣad* (4-part of *Mahāvīra's Buddhism and its relation to Hinduism*, p. 10, 11).

⁴ *Upaniṣad* (4-part of *Mahāvīra's Buddhism and its relation to Hinduism*, p. 10, 11).

⁵ *Upaniṣad* (4-part of *Mahāvīra's Buddhism and its relation to Hinduism*, p. 10, 11). See *Upaniṣad* (4-part of *Mahāvīra's Buddhism and its relation to Hinduism*, p. 10, 11).

⁶ *Upaniṣad* (4-part of *Mahāvīra's Buddhism and its relation to Hinduism*, p. 10, 11). See *Upaniṣad* (4-part of *Mahāvīra's Buddhism and its relation to Hinduism*, p. 10, 11).

method of realization of *arhanta* necessarily involves a process of perfect self-examination self-purification self-restraint and self-culture. If the experience of *arhanta* consists in the feeling of peacefulness tranquillity or harmony in the whole of one's being and in the whole of nature by which one is surrounded it is not possible without the practice of self-alienation from all that is not one's own. Thus the process of a self-alienation involves a method of viewing things as they are (*vatthakkhīṇam bhūtaṃ bhūtaṃ itaṃ itaṃ*). From one point of view the twofold ethical end of Buddhism is negative (1) to keep off the hindrances (*nīvaraṇas*) and (2) to put away the fetters (*samyojanas*) or to destroy the *āśayas* (the tendencies that lies deep in our nature.) From another point of view the end is positive namely to attain a perfect healthy condition of self. The rough scheme of self-culture through purity is set forth in the *Ratha-sūtrasutta* (*Majjhima*, I pp. 147—8) and it includes the following main items for consideration. —

Sīla-suddhi: Purity of conduct purity of behaviour purity of livelihood purity of motive, purity of morals, purity of character

Citta-suddhi: Purity of mind, purity of all things mental purity of mental attitude purity of mental vision, purity of mental development etc

Dutṭhi-suddhi: Purity of faith purity of thought purity of intellect

Kaṅkha-sāraṇa-suddhi: Purity of faith by the removal of doubt

Maggamaggāṇa-sāraṇa-suddhi: Purity of the path by the true understanding of what is and what is not the path

Paṇṇāpāṇa-sāraṇa-suddhi: Purity of the intellectual perception of the true path

Nānāsaṇa-suddhi: Purity of knowledge and insight

The main items are really three *Sīla-suddhi* (Purity of morals), *Citta-suddhi* (Purity of mind) and *Paññā-suddhi* (Purity of knowledge)

The rough sketch of the Buddhist system of Purity was developed by Buddhaghosha in his *Abhidhammāśāstra* and more fully by Upatissa in his *Paññāmagga*. The final development of the system took place in Buddhaghosha's *Paññāmagga*. There is no other

Buddhist work which bears comparison with Buddhaghosa's Path of Purity in respect of thoroughness and painstaking analysis.

4 *General Buddhist View* — *Nirvāṇa* means the annihilation of passion, hatred and delusion. It is the waning out of all evils — *raga*, *dosa*, and *moha*, — the diminishing of the vicious and the weak in the man which is the negative aspect of his positive advance in becoming (Mrs. Rhys Davids, *The Minor Anthologies* I p. xiv).

According to Childers, it means (1) the state of blissful sanctification of (wordly) existence in which Arhatship ends (*Def. of the Pali Language* p. 266). In its negative aspect it means the going out of greed, ill will and dullness, and also freedom from these; it may be variously described as comfort, end to all end of becoming, or life end of craving and the rest. In its positive aspect and as subjectively considered, it means mental illumination conceived as light, insight, state of being happiness, and cool and calm and content (*sāhāḍā nibbāṇa āpanama*) peace, unity, and self-mastery. Objectively considered it means truth, the highest good, a supreme opportunity, a regulated life, communion with the Best and bringing congenial work.¹

According to the *Akṣaddakapāṭha* *Nirvāṇa* is immortality (*amata*) and the bliss of emancipation (*nibbāṇa*). It is the tranquil state (*santam padam*).

According to the *Dhammapadam* *Nirvāṇa* is immortality, the opposite of which is death. The path of action is the path to immortality, and the way of indolence is the way to death (*appamādo amata-padam pamādo maraṇo padam*). It is secure from the worldly contact and unsurpassed in its reach. The path that leads to gain is one, and the path that leads to *Nirvāṇa* another (*añña hi lābhā-pamādo añña nibbāṇa-gaṇṇa*). The Buddhas declare the *Nirvāṇa* as the highest condition (*paramam*). It is the greatest happiness (*paramam sukham*). With the vision of *Nirvāṇa* the sinful nature vanishes for ever (*aññaṃ gacchanti dāsa*). Without knowledge there is no meditation, without meditation there is no knowledge, he who has knowledge and meditation is near unto *Nirvāṇa* (*yanto jhāneti ca paṭibhāsa, so ya nibbānamantike*).

It is distinctly stated in the *Sutta-Nipāta* that *Nirvāṇa* is a

¹ The characterization is based on The Poems of the Early Buddhist Brothers and Sisters.

matchless island which possesses nothing grasps it nothing and which is the destroyer of decay and death (pp 211—12) ¹ The world is bound by pleasure and by leaving desire *Nirvana* can be attained (*Ibid* pp 214—215)

According to the *Uttarottara Jātaka* (II Cowell p 17) one who possesses strong will cherishes all good tilas to the Refuge and follows the path leading to *Nirvana*, is capable of destroying all ties by slow degrees The *Mora Jātaka* (Cowell II, p 26) describes *Nirvana* as the only everlasting thing, and says that all other things being composite in their nature are unsubstantial transient and subject to living and death The *Gandavindu Jātaka* (Cowell V p 55) says that zeal is the way to *Nirvana*

According to the *Vissuddhimagga* (Vol II, p 612) *Nirvana* is the extinction of the five *Āhāsikā* ² The attributes of *Nirvana* consist of absence of passion destruction of pride, getting rid of thirst freedom from attachment and destruction of all sensual pleasures It is the cessation of all sufferings It can be attained through meditation wisdom precept steadfastness and the rest

According to the *Abhkāraṇī* (p 404), *Nirvana* means that from which the arrow of desire is gone away (*ānāha vanikkāṇā ānāha nigalāṇa idāṇaṇi vāraṇa nibbānaṇi*) It is freedom from all sins and final release from lower nature

In the *Samangalāsāsaṇī* (I 217) Buddhaghosa says that a person obtains *Nirvana* by making himself free from the wilderness of misdeeds It is described here as the state of bliss

In the *Kaṭṭhāvatthupākaṇa āthakatha* (p 176) *Nirvana* is described as a void ³

According to the *Abhidhammatthasāṅgahī* *Nirvana* is so called because it is a departure from that craving which is called *vāsa* lusting or craving It is to be realized through knowledge belonging to the four paths It is the object of those paths and their fruition It is supramundane or transcendental (*lokuttara*) It is excellent uncreated, and free from lust

According to Nāgaseṇa's view in the *Mūlakaṇṭha* an *Arāya ānāha*

¹ *Ārāyaṇaṇaṇi nibbānaṇi etam dāpaṇaṇi nibbānaṇi idāṇaṇi brahmacarijāṇaṇi āpāraṇi āpāraṇaṇi*

² *Pañcannaṇi Āhāsikāṇaṇi ānāhaṇi* (*Vissuddhimagga* II p 612)

³ *Nibbānaṇi āthakatha Sūṭṭānta*

does not take pleasure in the senses and their objects. Inasmuch as he does not find delight in them, in him craving ceases and by the cessation of craving (tanha) grasping (upādāna) ceases, and by the cessation of grasping, becoming (bhava) ceases, and when becoming has ceased birth ceases, and with its cessation, birth, old age and death, grief, lamentation, pain, sorrow, and despair cease to exist. In this sense cessation is *Nirvana*.

Just as those whose hands and feet have not been cut off know how sad a thing it is to have them cut off by hearing the sounds of the lamentation of those whose hands and feet have been cut off even so it is by hearing the pleasing words of those who have seen *Nirvana* that they know how happy a state it is.

Nirvana being uncaused there is a cause that will bring about the realization of *Nirvana*, but there is no cause that will bring about *Nirvana* itself. A man by his ordinary power can go up from a certain place to the Himalayas, the King of mountains, but he cannot bring the Himalayas to his place. Such is the case with *Nirvana*. Further *Nirvana* is uncompounded, not made of anything yet it exists. It is perceptible to the mind. By means of his pure heart refined and straight free from the obstacles free from low cravings the disciple of the Noble One can realize *Nirvana*. Just as wind exists though it cannot be shown by its colour or its form, whether as thin or thick, or short or long, even so *Nirvana* exists, though it cannot be shown in colour or in form.

The supposed purity of infant mind is no comparison for the purity of consciousness in *Nirvana*. The mind of one under seven years of age is powerless and weak, mean, small, slight, obscure and dull, whereas the condition of *Nirvana* is transcendental, important, weighty, wide-reaching and extensive. The infant with imperfect mind is unable to grasp an idea so great.

Nirvana is all bliss though the process seeking after it is painful. It is bliss unalloyed. When it is suggested that *Nirvana* is painful it is simply meant that the process of seeking after *Nirvana* is painful, while *Nirvana* itself is bliss, pure and simple and there is no pain mixed with it.

Just as it is impossible to tell the measure of the water in the sea or the number of creatures dwelling therein though after all the sea exists so it is impossible to tell the form or figure or duration

or measure of *Nirvāṇa* though after all, it is a condition that does exist. These are some of its characteristics. It is untarnished by evil dispositions. It is cool and assuages the fever arising from all evil dispositions. It does allay the thirst of the craving after lust, the craving after future life, and the craving after worldly prosperity. It is the refuge of beings tormented with the poison of evil dispositions. It does put an end to grief. It is ambrosia. It is mighty and boundless and fills not with all beings who enter into it. It is the abode of all 'good men' — the *bhikkhus*. It is all in blossom as it were with the innumerable and various and fine flowers of purity of knowledge and of emancipation. It is the support of life for it puts an end to old age and death. It does increase the power of *iddhi* or supernatural powers. It puts a stop in all beings to the suffering arising from evil disposition. It overcomes in all beings the weakness which arises from hunger and every sort of pain. It is not born neither does it grow old it does not pass away it has no rebirth it is unconquerable therefore cannot carry it, it is not attached to anything it is the sphere in which *arabhis* move nothing can obstruct it, and it is infinite. It satiates every desire. It causes delight. It is full of lustre. It is hard to attain to. It is unequalled in the beauty of its perfume. It is praised by all the Noble ones. It is beautiful in righteousness. It has the pleasant perfume of righteousness. It has a pleasant taste. It is very exalted. It is unmoveable. It is inaccessible to sinners. It is a condition in which no evil dispositions can grow. It is free from desire to please and from resentment.

Nirvāṇa is neither past nor future, nor present nor produced nor not-produced, nor producible.

Lastly *Nirvāṇa* is to be known by freedom from distress and danger by confidence, peace, calm bliss, happiness, delicacy, purity and freshness. He who orders his life aright, realizes that *Nirvāṇa*. He who gains the highest fruit of Ariship, may be said to have seen *Nirvāṇa* face to face.

A layman also can attain *Nirvāṇa*. A close study of the *Cohattika-Sutta* (p. 58) and the *Jasa-Sutta* (p. 129) of the *Mahāniddesa* together with their commentaries by Dhammapāla helps up to look for the *arabhis* both among the householders and the recluse. The *arabhis* are defined as persons who have attenuated their sins and

have seen *Nirudda* and as to householders they are represented as persons who are over-burdened with all household duties. No other discrimination is sought to be made between the *Aggrahamas* and the *Anaggrahamas* than this that while the former keep to household life the latter do not. As for the attainment, both are held out as equally competent to win the highest state which is *Nirvana*.¹¹ In the *Agguttara Nikāya*, we find mention of 21 lay *arahats*.¹² Rhys Davids in his introduction to the *Samaññaphala Sutta* calls them lay men *arahats* (S B B., II, 63 fn.) In the *Akkaṅkikā* (P T S. Bk. IV, p. 268), we find *Kalaputta* Yasa a householder. Uttara and young Brahman Setu attained *arahatship* in all the circumstances characterizing the life of the laity.¹³ Referring to this point S. Z. Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids have inferred that a layman under exceptional circumstances may attain *arahatship* but to keep it he must give up the world (*Points of Controversy*, p. 158 fn.) Rhys Davids and Mr. Rhys Davids in Part III, p. 3 of the *Dialogues of the Buddha* (S B B. Vol. IV) have raised this question 'who in the olden period could be an *arahat*?' The answer is 'Any one — man or woman, old or young, lay or religious. It is distinctly mentioned in the *Mahāniddhāna* that, whether he is a layman or a recluse, he who attains the supreme insight to the supreme conduct of life he too will win his way to the excellent condition of *arahatship*.'

[illegible][illegible]

¹ Yava kulapattāḥ. I have gathered these seeds from the garden in a jar. (The jar is a small earthenware jar, called a kulapaṭṭa.)

*Gihī pi maharajā sammā-paṭipanno āraḍhako hoti nāyaṃ
dhammam kusalam paṭṭhaṇṇo pi maharajā sammā-paṭipanno
āraḍhako hoti nāyaṃ dhammam kusalam*

It is clear from this that the householder if he leads a religious life may attain to arahantship which is *nirvāṇa*. The *Mihedapaṭṭha* further points out that whosoever has attained, as a layman, to arahantship one of the two courses is left to him and no other — either that very day he enters the Order or he dies; for beyond that day he cannot last (*See Questions of King Mihinda*, II, p. 96).

All persons who as laymen, living at home and in the enjoyment of the pleasures of senses realize in themselves the condition of Peace, the Supreme Good *Nirvāṇa* — all of them had in former births accomplished their training, laid the foundation in the practice of the thirteen vows, had purified their walk and conduct by means of them and so now even as laymen living at home and in the enjoyment of the pleasures of senses they do realize in themselves the condition of Peace, the Supreme Good *Nirvāṇa* (*Ibid* II p. 253).

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